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ARTICLES
Child Support: Shifting the Financial Burden in
Low-Income Families
Stacy Brustin*

INTRODUCTION
Policymakers tout child support as an important ingredient in the fight to lift
America's low-income families out of poverty.' The reality, however, is that
millions of low-wage earning parents are unable to support themselves, let alone
their children, with their limited income. Child support guidelines account for
this reality through the use of self-support reserves and low-income adjustments.
Nonresident parents 2 who earn below a certain amount, generally pegged to the
federal poverty guideline,3 are deemed unable to provide anything but the most
minimal amount of child support-typically $50 per month or less. An
unintended consequence of these well-intentioned provisions is that low-wageearning resident parents are left to bear the financial responsibility for children.
Although some of these resident parents receive public assistance, child care
subsidies or tax credits, to reduce the financial burden, many do not. This shifting
of financial burden undermines the basic child support principle that both parents

* Stacy Brustin is an Associate Professor of Law at The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law. She is a supervising attorney in the General Practice Clinic of Columbus Community
Legal Services, where she represents low-income clients in a variety of civil cases, including child
support matters. She is a commissioner on the D.C. Child Support Guideline Commission. B.A., Tufts
University; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Hilary Temme and Iryna
Kurbatava for their research assistance on this article. She would also like to thank the Catholic
University of America for their financial support of this research. 0 2012, Stacy Brustin.
1. See ELAINE SORENSEN, URBAN INST., CHILD SUPPORT PLAYS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE FOR
POOR CUSTODIAL FAMILIES 1 (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412272-childsupport-plays-important-role.pdf.
2. A variety of terms are used to denote a parent who pays child support to the other parent of his or her
children. Generally, the parent who lives with or spends less physical time with the children is responsible
for paying support. This Article refers to the parent owing support as the "nonresident parent," although
other terms such as "noncustodial parent" and "obligor" are frequently used in the literature. The
nonresident parent is typically, though not always, the father of the children. This Article uses the term
"resident parent" to denote the parent with whom the children live with the majority of the time.
3. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2012 Poverty Guidelines,ASPE.HHS.GOV, http://aspe.hhs.
gov/poverty/12poverty.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
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should share in the financial responsibility of raising their children and
jeopardizes the needs of children.
When welfare reform initially passed in 1996, there was an underlying
assumption that poor women could escape poverty by finding a job.4 Their flight
from poverty and public dependence would be aided by increased child support.
In fact, it was the increased support (assured through the enhanced enforcement
mechanisms adopted as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA)) that would help push women over the edge of poverty into
greater self-sufficiency. 6 However, there was no acknowledgment that supplementing low wages with child support would be particularly difficult for many
low-income, female-headed households because the fathers of these children
were unemployed or in low-wage jobs.7 Although these measures had some
positive effect toward increasing the child support that resident parents received,
low-income, nonresident wage earners typically paid a much higher percentage
of income for child support than middle- and upper-income wage earners. 9
Low-wage earning nonresident parents had limited disposable income available to pay child support because of the high costs of living in many parts of the

4. Lucie E. White, On the "Consensus" to End Welfare: Where Are the Women's Voices?, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 843, 851 (1994).
5. See generally Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the
1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L. Q. 519 (1996) (providing a detailed analysis of child support enforcement
legislation culminating with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996); see also JOY MOSES ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, "SISTERS ARE DolN' IT FOR THEMSELVES," BUT
COULD USE SOME HELP: FATHERHOOD POLICY AND THE WELL-BEING OF Low-INCOME MOTHERS AND

CHILDREN 7 (2010), availableat http://www.cffpp.org/publications/Sisters%20are%20doing.pdf; ELAINE
SORENSEN & HELEN OLIVER, URBAN INST., CHILD SUPPORT REFORMS IN PRWORA: INITIAL IMPACTS 4, 7

(2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410421 discussionO2-02.pdf.
6. SORENSEN & OLIVER, supra note 5, at 3, 7. Historically, lawmakers had promoted federal child
support legislation as a response to child poverty that they argued was caused by fathers' failure to
financially support their children. See Ann Cammett, Deadbeats,Deadbrokes,& Prisoners,18 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 127, 136 (2011) (citing STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 94TH CONG., CHILD SUPPORT
DATA & MATERIALS 3 (Comm. Print 1975)) ("The basic premise underlying the creation of the national
child support program and enforcement provisions was that non-supporting fathers were the principal
agents of increased welfare costs and that child poverty was due their failure to pay support.").
7. SORENSEN & OLIVER, supra note 5, at 11.

8. See generally id. at 4 (demonstrating that enhanced paternity establishment mechanisms and new
hires directories were effective enforcement tools for increasing the number of child support orders
established and for assisting in collection of partial or full amounts due).
9. Maureen A. Pirog & Lanlan Xu, A Twenty-One Years Retrospective on Child Support Guidelines
5-6 (2010) (unpublished paper) (on file with author). This was often the result of child support orders
calculated based on imputation of income. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS: EFFECTS OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDER

AMOUNTS ON PAYMENTS BY Low-INCOME PARENTs 1 (2006), availableat http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
cse/pol/IM/2007/im-07-04c.pdf ) [hereinafter STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS] (citing ELAINE SORENSEN &
CHAVA ZIBMAN, URBAN INST., A LOOK AT POOR DADS WHO DON'T PAY CHILD SUPPORT (2000), availableat

www.urban.org/pdf/discussionOO-07.pdf [hereinafter A LOOK ATPOOR DADS].
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country, as well as costs associated with employment (such as transportation).'o
Because many income support and benefit programs are only available to parents
living with dependent children, nonresident parents are not eligible for such
benefits." As a result, enforcement measures had a disproportionately negative
effect on low-income non-custodial parents. These parents were less likely to pay
support, particularly when they had significant arrearage owed and when they
saw that the money they were paying was going to the government to reimburse
welfare costs instead of going directly to their children.' 2
Policymakers began to distinguish between those parents who had the means
to support their children but chose not to do so, commonly referred to as
"deadbeat dads," from parents who did not have the financial resources to support
their children, "deadbroke dads."' 3 Self-support reserves and low-income
adjustments offered mechanisms for addressing the realities faced by nonresident

10. STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS, supra note 9, at 1-2.
11. ELAINE SORENSEN & CHAVA ZIBMAN, URBAN INST., POOR DADS WHO DON'T PAY CHILD SUPPoir:
DEADBEATS OR DISADVANTAGED? 4 (2001), available at http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/anf-b30.pdf
[hereinafter DEADBEATS OR DISADVANTAGED]; see also Liz SCHOTT & CLARE CHO, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: SAFETY NET WEAKENING DESPITE INCREASED NEED
1-2 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-26-11pov.pdf. For example, single, non-disabled,
low-income adults are generally not eligible for Medicaid. Id. This will change in 2014 when states are

required to change eligibility requirements as part of the Affordable Care Act. See KAISER COMM'N ON
KEY FACTS, WHERE ARE STATES TODAY? MEDICAID AND CHIP ELIGIBILITY LEVELS FOR CHILDREN AND

NON-DISABLED ADULTS 2 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7993-02.pdf. A few
jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia, have accelerated the implementation of these provisions
and now provide such coverage. See NAT'L HEALTHCARE FOR THE HOMELESS COUNCIL, STATE OPTIONS FOR
MEDICAID EXPANSION 1 (2011), available at http://www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Policy

BriefMedicaidExpansionOptions.pdf.
12. Lenna Nepomnyaschy & Irwin Garfinkel, Child Support Enforcement andFather'sContributions
to Their Nonmarital Children8-9 (Ctr, for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 2006-09-FF,
April 2007), availableat http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WPO6-09-FF.pdf.

13. Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1001, 1004 (2006); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-05-99-00390, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS FOR

Low-INCOME NON-CUSTODIAL PARENTS 1 (2000), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oeilreports/oei-05-9900390.pdf. This Article does not address the issue of underground employment. See, e.g., CTR. ON
FATHERS, FAMILIES, & PUB. POLICY & NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., DOLLARS AND SENSE: IMPROVING THE
DETERMINATION OF CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS FOR Low-INCOME MOTHERS, FATHERS, AND CHILDREN 6,
11 (2002) [hereinafter DOLLARS AND SENSE] ("For some low-income parents, work in the informal
economy is an important source of additional income. For example, based on interviews with unmarried
fathers in several cities, the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study found that almost three in ten
unmarried fathers (28%) participated in the informal economy, including unreported earnings from
self-employment, under-the-table work for cash, "hustling," etc. For these fathers, such work raised their
earnings by $3,293 a year on average or 23%." Id. at 6 (citing CHRISTINA NORLAND, BENDHEIM-THOMAN
CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING, FRAGILE FAMILIES RESEARCH BRIEF: UNWED FATHERS, THE
UNDERGROUND ECONOMY, AND CHILD SuPPoRT POLICY 2 (2001); Lauren M. Rich, Regular and Irregular

Earnings of Unwed Fathers: Implications for Child Support Practices? tbl. 1 (Ctr. for Research on Child
Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 99-10-FF, 1999))).
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parents with limited financial means.14 Low-income resident parents could
continue to rely on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and other
assistance programs.'" States began adjusting guidelines to account for the reality
that low-income nonresident parents who paid a high percentage of their income
in child support would not have sufficient funds remaining to support themselves. "

TANF benefits, however, were never intended to cover the subsistence needs
of families.' 7 With time limits and efforts to decrease funding or at least keep
funding flat, TANF does not provide the safety net that might justify the decrease
in support caused by the application of self-support reserves and low-income
adjustments.'s Many of those on TANF must seek other resources in order to
make ends meet or go without basic necessities.' 9
Perhaps more significantly, resident parents who have low-wage jobs typically
do not qualify for public assistance payments. An overwhelming majority of the
parents who have child support cases brought by government child support
agencies across the country do not receive TANF. 20 They are parents who have
either never received TANF or who formerly received benefits but no longer do.
They may qualify for food stamps, Medicaid, and earned income tax credits, but
these parents must spend a large proportion of their income attempting to meet

14. See, e.g., D.C. CHILD
RECOMMENDATIONS

SUPPORT GUIDELINE COMM'N, JULY 2004 CHILD SUPPORT COMMISSION FINAL

21 (2004) (discussing need to leave nonresident parents sufficient income upon

which to subsist).
15. See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families(TANF) Overview, DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,

http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/tanf/tanf-overview.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2012); see also
Linda Gordon & Felice Batlan, The Legal History ofAid to Dependent Children Program,Soc. WELFARE
HIST. PROJECT, http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/programs/aid-to-dependent-children-the-legalhistory/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
16. ROBERT G. WILLIAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR
CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS 60-61 (1987).
17. Jared Bernstein & Mark Greenberg, Reforming Welfare Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 19, 2001, at
10, 16 ("Has welfare reform improved the well-being of poor families with children? Our review of the
evidence suggests that for some it has but for many it has not. There's more work but not much more
disposable income, especially after one takes into account the expenses associated with work. For the
families who haven't been able to break into the labor market, the tattered safety net is providing less help
than ever.").
18. Liz SCHOTT & IFE FINCH, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TANF BENEFITS ARE LOW AND
HAVE NOT KEPT PACE WITH INFLATION: BENEFITS ARE NOT ENOUGH TO MEET FAMILIES' BASIC NEEDS 1-5
(2010), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10- 14-10tanf.pdf.
19. Id.; see also KATIE KERSTETTER & JONI PODSCHUN, D.C. FISCAL POLICY INST. & SOME, INC.,
VOICES FOR CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES ON STRENGTHENING WELFARE-TO-WORK FROM DC TANF RECIPIENTS
32-34 (2009), availableat http://dcfpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/l1/11-12-09TANFreport.pdf.
20. See Office of Child Support Enforcement, FY2010 Preliminary Report, DEP'T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (May 1, 2011), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/fy20lO-preliminary-report [hereinafter FY2010 PreliminaryReport]. According to federal Office of Child Support Enforcement statistics,

there were 2.2 million TANF cases in fiscal year 2010 as compared to 6.8 million "former-TANF' cases
(resident parent no longer receiving TANF) and 6.9 million "never assistance" cases (resident parent had
never received TANF). See id.
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the basic needs of their children. 2 1 These families face extraordinary hardship
and, in situations where the nonresident parent is low-income, receive little or no
child support once self-support reserves and low-income adjustments are
applied.22
While many of the self-support and low-income adjustment reforms were
based on the laudable policy goal of allowing nonresident parents to retain
enough wages to meet their own subsistence needs, there are no companion
policy initiatives to address the fact that these reforms reduce the availability of
resources to low-income children and often shift the burden of financial support
to the resident parent. 2 3 "Deadbroke dads" may be working or diligently
searching for employment, but if they work part-time, seasonally, or even
full-time at minimum wage, then self-support reserves and low-income adjustments will apply. This means that there is little or no support to "pass through" in
TANF cases, even if the state has a generous pass-through policy. 24 The situation
is intensified when the resident parent is also a low-wage, often part-time, worker
or is unemployed and relying on paltry monthly TANF payments. In these
situations, child support does not supplement household income, and resident
parents are unable to keep their children out of poverty.
This Article focuses on the way in which self-support reserves (SSR) and
low-income adjustments reduce the already-scarce resources available to children living in low-income households and shift the responsibility for supporting
children to the resident parent. The Article suggests several methods adjusting
guidelines to diminish this effect. Adjustments to the "deadbroke" provisions of
guidelines will enhance the integrity of child support formulas and generate
modest increases in support for children.
However, parents will not be able to take full responsibility for supporting their
children until they earn enough or receive financial supports to meet both
individual and family subsistence needs. Reforming child support guidelines and
creating a system that treats the subsistence needs of low-income parents equally
is a short-term remedy, but it does little to address the much more significant
reality: low-income parents, the majority of whom are employed, do not earn
enough to financially support their families.25 With the onset of the recession and

21. Rebecca M. Ryan et al., Unwed Mothers' Private Safety Nets and Children's Socioemotional
Wellbeing, 71 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 278, 278-79 (2009).
22. See Jane C. Venohr & Tracy E. Griffith, Child Support Guidelines: Issues & Reviews, 43 FAM. CT.
REv. 415, 425-26 (2005); Pirog & Xu, supra note 9, at 16; see also Part IV infra.
23. DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 13, at 11.

24. See 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1)(B) (2006) (stating that, although parents on TANF must assign their
right to collect child support to the state, each state may pass through some or all of the money collected
to the TANF recipient). For example, Wisconsin decided to pass through all child support collected to
families and the payments were disregarded when calculating TANF benefits. See DOLLARS AND SENSE,
supra note 13, at 9.
25. Cammett, supra note 6, at 136. As commentators have noted, "[t]he basic premise underlying the
creation of the national child support program and enforcement provisions was that non-supporting
fathers were the principal agents of increased welfare costs and that child poverty was due to their failure
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one of the most significant surges in unemployment in decades, these struggles
have only intensified.
If one of the goals of social policy in general, and child support policy in
particular, is to ensure that parents remain responsible for supporting their
families, then policymakers must do more to enable them to fulfill this obligation.
As Mark Greenberg, the current Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services has written, "[t]he starting premise is
that if the polity wants to promote work and improve the well-being of families
with children, personal responsibility must be accompanied by public obligation." 2 6 With this in mind, the last section of this Article advocates for the
development of employment programs, minimum wage increases, interim
financial assistance, and tax incentives to facilitate this change.
I.

CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE MODELS: IMPACT ON NONRESIDENT PARENTS

Every state and the District of Columbia have enacted child support guidelines
to ensure that parents who live in separate households share responsibility for
financially supporting their children.2 7 The Family Support Act of 1988
mandated that all states that receive federal funding for state child support
enforcement must adopt child support guidelines. 28 The guidelines take one of
three forms: the Income Shares Model, the Percentage of Income Model, or the
Melson Model. 2 9 Thirty-six states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands use the Income Shares Model,30 in which the incomes of both
to pay support." However, as Cammett has noted, "[o]ne indication that child support payments alone are
not a viable solution for poverty is that, for all the support collected from parents-made possible by
powerful enforcement tools at the disposal of the government-state child support systems are still owed
well over $107 billion dollars in arrears." Id. at 141 (citing FY2010 PreliminaryReport, supra note 20, at
tbl. 1).
26. Bernstein & Greenberg, supra note 17, at 14.
27. Pursuant to the Family Support Act of 1988, in order to receive federal funding for child support
enforcement efforts, every state was required to develop a presumptive child support guideline. See Pub.
L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2345 (1988); LAURA MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION § 1.02 (2d ed. 2010); Ingrid Rothe & Daniel R. Meyer, Setting Child Support Orders:
HistoricalApproaches and Ongoing Struggles, Focus, Spring 2000, at 58, 59.
28. See Pirog & Xu, supra note 9, at 1.

29. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ESSENTIALS FOR ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 151-52 (2002), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2002/
reports/essentials/index.html.
30. These include: Alabama (ALA. R. JuDIcAL ADMIN. 32(c)(1) (2012)); Arizona (ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 25 app. (2012)); California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (West 2003)); Colorado (CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. §14-10-115 (1)(b)(i) (West 2012); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-215a (2011)); District of
Columbia (D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(f)(1)(A-D) (2012)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.29(2) (West
2012)); Guam (5 GUAM CODE ANN. § 34118(d) (2009)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15(b) (2012);
Idaho (IDAHO CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES § 4(a) (West 2012)); Indiana (IND. R. CT., CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINE I (West 2012)); Iowa (IowA CT. R. 9.3(1) (West 2012)); Kansas (Order Re: Kansas Child
Support Guidelines (Kan. 2012), available at http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-courts/supreme-court/
administrative-orders/Admin-order-261.pdf); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(3) (West
2012)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.2(c) (2011)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, § 2006(1)
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parents are combined and compared to an estimated figure of what parents living
together with the same number of children and same income would spend on
their children. 3 1 Each parent is liable for paying a share of the cost for raising the
child proportional to that parent's share of the combined income.32
Ten states have adopted the Percentage of Income Model, which determines
support by taking a percentage of the noncustodial parent's income. 3 This
percentage is based on studies of child-rearing expenses. 34 The third model, the
Melson Formula, uses a complex income-shares approach that takes more
account of the financial needs of the parents in calculating support. Three states
currently use this model. 36 Finally, Massachusetts has adopted a hybrid model
that combines elements of the Income Shares and Percentage of Income
Models.

(2011)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-204(a)(1) (West 2012)); Michigan (MICH. COMP.
LAws § 722.3 (2012)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §518A.35(2) (2012)); Missouri (Mo. R. Civ. P. form
14 (West 2012)); Nebraska (NEB. CT. R. §4-201 (West 2012)); New Jersey (N.J. CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES R. OF PRACTICE app. 9-A(4) (West 2012)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-11.1(E)
(2012)); North Carolina (N.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 2 (N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts 2011);
Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.021 (West 2011)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 119
(2012)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.275(2)(b) (West 2012)); Pennsylvania (PA. R. Civ. P.
1910.6-1(a)(1) (West 2012)); Rhode Island (Order 2007-03 Re: Rhode Island Family Court Child
Support Formula and Guidelines, at *1 (R.I. Fam. Ct. 2007)); South Carolina (S.C. CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES § I at 1 (Child Support Enforcement Div., S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. 2006), available at
http://www.state.sc.us/dss/csed/forms/2006guidelines.pdf); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 25-76.2 (2012)); Tennessee (TENN. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES R. 1240-2-4-.03 (1)(a) (West 2012)); Utah
(UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-205(l) (West 2012)); Vermont (VT. STAr. ANN. tit. 15, § 654 (2012)); Virgin
Islands (V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 345(c) 2012); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(A) (2012));
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.19.011(1) (2012)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 48-13-102
(2012)); Wyoming (Wyo. STAr. ANN. § 20-2-304(a) (2012)).
31. JANE C. VENOHR, CTR. FOR POL'Y RESEARCH, 2008 UPDATE OF THE MARYLAND CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES SCHEDULE 3-4 (2008).

32. Rothe & Meyer, supra note 27, at 59.
33. These states include: Alaska (ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(a) (West 2012)); Arkansas (In re Admin.
Order No. 10: Ark. Child Support Guidelines, 347 Ark. 1064, 1072 (2002)); Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/505(a)(1) (2012)); Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN. §43-19-101(1) (2000)); Nevada (NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. §125B.070(1)(b)(1 -5) (West 2011)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §458-C: 1(111) (2012));
New York (N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(l)(b)(3) (Mckinney 2012)); North Dakota (N.D. ADMIN. CODE
75-02-04.1 (2012)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.125(b) (2011)); see also VENOHR, supra note 31,
at 5.
34. Rothe & Meyer, supra note 27, at 59. The child rearing studies used to determine costs are often
the same studies used to determine cost estimates for income share models. Id.
35. Id.
36. Delaware, Hawaii, and Montana use the Melson Formula. See Venohr & Griffith, supra note 22, at
417-18 ("The Melson formula first prorates an amount to cover the child's basic needs between the
parents. Then, if the nonresidential parent has disposable income leftover after meeting his/her share of
the child's basic needs and an amount to provide for his/her own basic needs, an additional percentage is
applied to the remaining disposable income to arrive at the final support award amount.").
37. VENOHR, supra note 31, at 4.
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Child support guidelines were not designed to ameliorate child poverty."
Rather, the original goal of implementing guidelines was to ensure "continuity of
expenditure"" so that parents living separately would expend the same
proportion of their income on their children as they would spend if they lived
together. 4 0 The guidelines were developed using the model of a divorced couple,
in which one parent retains primary custody and the other parent is employed
full-time. 4 1 Research demonstrated that, upon divorce, the household income of
the nonresident parent often increased while the household income of the resident
parent plummeted.4 2 The guidelines were based, in part, on the principle that both
parents should share responsibility for financially supporting their children in
proportion to their income.4 3 However, the guidelines were developed using child
rearing cost and expenditure estimates that did not account adequately for the
cost of maintaining separate households.' In addition, many of these guidelines
did not distinguish between low-wage or high-wage earners when determining
the percentage of income that obligors owed in support.4 5 This approach had a
disproportionately negative impact on low-wage earners because their resources
were so limited.
Approximately 25% of nonresident parents owing child support have reported
income below the federal poverty level.4 6 A parent who works forty hours a week

38. Rothe & Meyer, supra note 27, at 60; see also Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child
Support Policy, in CHILD SuppoRr: THE NEXT FRONTIER 19 (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds.,

2000).
39. Rothe & Meyer, supra note 27, at 59 (citing Martha Garrison, ChildSupport Policy: Guidelines
and Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157, 157-89 (1999)).
40. Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT
FRONTIER, supra note 38, at 19. Scholars have critiqued this model as failing to reflect the situation of

families who never lived together in the first place. Ira Mark Ellman has argued that states have deferred
to economic consultants who have designed formulas which appear to be objective or reflective of a
quantitative analysis of costs of raising children when, in fact, there are implicit underlying policy
choices that legislators rather than consultants should explicitly make. See Ira Mark Ellman & Tara
O'Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support,45 HARV. J. ON LEG. 107, 121 (2008). Ellman and Ellman

argue that legislators should devise guidelines based on three fundamental goals: 1) enhancing the
wellbeing of children, 2) ensuring that both parents contribute to the support of children, and
3) preventing gross disparities among households. Id.
41. Maureen Waller & Robert Plotnick, A Failed Relationship? Low-Income Familiesand the Child
Support Enforcement System, Focus, Spring 2000, at 12.
42. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323-56 (1985).

43. Laura W. Morgan & Mark C. Lino, A Comparison of Child Support Awards Calculated Under
States' Child Support Guidelines with Expenditures on Children Calculated by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 33 FAM. L.Q. 191, 193 (1999).
44. See Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy,in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT

FRONTIER, supra note 38, at 18-21. The model did not account for the cost of two low-income wage
earners maintaining separate households. Id. at 20-21.
45. See Pirog & Xu, supra note 9, at 9-12. In Pirog's study, national trends show the disproportionate
impact of Percentage of Income on low-income wage earners has been reduced. Id. at 6.
46. STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS, supra note 9, at 1.
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at $7.25 per hour 4 7 earns an annual income significantly below the federal
poverty guidelines for a family of three. These parents often face significant
barriers to employment-including limited education, unstable housing, lack of
job experience, and former incarceration.4 8 Programs designed to enhance skills
have had mixed success and take time to achieve results that translate into more
child support for families.
Many low-income fathers do not have health insurance.o Yet, it is this group
that is likely to be working in jobs which have hazardous working conditions.
In addition, low-income fathers are at significant risk for a number of health
problems, including hypertension, high cholesterol, and weight problems, which
lead to more serious health problems.5 2 This lack of insurance has implications
for fathers' ability to work and support their children over the long term.
Studies show that even among low-income fathers who are married, high school

47. The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour as of July 24, 2009. Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP'T
LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/minimumwage.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
48. See John M. Martinez & Cynthia Miller, The Effects of Parents' FairShare on the Employment
and Earningsof Low-Income, Noncustodial Fathers, Focus, Spring 2000, at 23, 24. Martinez and Miller

discuss the Parents' Fair Share Program (PFS), a demonstration program implemented in seven urban
areas across the country. The program was designed to provide enhanced employment and parenting
support services to noncustodial parents in the hope that such services would increase child support
compliance. The project started in 1994 and targeted low-income non-custodial parents, many of whom
had significant barriers to employment. Id. at 23.
49. Overall, the PFS achieved moderate success in increasing employment and earnings for less
employable fathers, though a quarter of the men who were assigned to participate in the program did not
work at all during the year of the program. It is likely that many of these men needed more intensive
educational services than the program was able to offer. Id. at 26.
50. BENDHEIM-THOMAN CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING & COLUMBIA POPULATION
RESEARCH CTR., Low-INCOME FATHERS' ACCESS TO HEALTH INSURANCE 1 (2009), available at http://www.

fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/briefs/ResearchBrief45.pdf

[hereinafter BENDHEIM-THOMAN

CTR.l; see

also COMM'N To BUILD A HEALTHIER AM., ROBERT JOHNSON WOOD FOUND., WORK MATTERS FOR HEALTH 8

(2008), availableat http://www.commissiononhealth.org/PDF/Oe8cal3d-6fb8-45 1d-bac8-7dl5343aacff(
Issue%2OBrief%204%2ODec%2008%20-%2OWork%20and%2OHealth.pdf ("Lower-wage workers also
are less likely to have health-related benefits such as paid sick leave, job flexibility and access to
workplace wellness programs.").
51. CoMM'N To BUILD A HEALTHIER AM., supra note 50, at 8 ("Members of the most socially-

disadvantaged groups tend to have low-paying jobs with high levels of occupational hazards and
work-related health risks. Workers in lower-status and lower-wage jobs are disproportionately exposed to
health-impairing working conditions, reinforcing the burden of ill health and social disadvantage among
particular social groups in this country.").
52. URBAN

INST.,

Low-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES: FACTS & FIGURES 2 (2005), available at

http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900832.pdf [hereinafter FACTS AND FIGURES] ("Sixteen percent of
full-time workers heading low-income families report fair or poor health, compared with 7[%] of workers
in middle-income families. Low-income adults working a moderate amount are even more likely to have
health problems, with 25[%] reporting fair or poor health. Health problems may be contributing to their
limited hours of work. Low-income families are also more likely than middle-income families to have a
child in poor health."); see also BENDHE[M-THOMAN CTR., supra note 50, at 1.
53. BENDHEIM-THOMAN CTR., supra note 50, at 1. Lack of health insurance also affects the material

wellbeing of the fathers' family in that health insurance is not available to cover his children. These
families often face crippling medical bills, sometimes foregoing food and other basic necessities to cover
the costs of medical bills. Id.
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graduates, and employed, a significant number do not have health insurance.5 4
The passage of the Affordable Care Act will slowly improve fathers' access to
health coverage as it expands Medicaid eligibility for single individuals and
provides for premium credits for individuals earning up to 400% of the federal
poverty level beginning in 2014."
Public benefits programs are designed to provide a financial floor beneath poor
parents and their children to prevent them from living in abject poverty. However,
single fathers typically do not qualify for many of these programs.5 6 TANF is
only available to parents who have dependent children with whom they reside.
Food stamps are available to single individuals for limited periods of time."
As a result of their precarious financial situations, large numbers of lowincome nonresident parents fail to pay support and accrue significant arrearages. 59 One study showed that 60% of low-income non-custodial parents do not
pay child support primarily because they have limited income due to incarceration, lack of.education, and lack of employment opportunity.60 In addition, many
of these fathers have children with more than one partner and there is not enough
money to go around.
Low-income parents who are re-entering the community after incarceration
face heightened obstacles.6 2 Researchers point out that "[t]he reality of modernday mass incarceration has immeasurably skewed the breadwinner paradigm on
which the child support system is based: millions of parents are now removed

54. Id. at 3.
55. CHRIS L. PETERSON & THOMAS GABE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41137, HEALTH INSURANCE
PREMIUM CREDITS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 3 (2010), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/HlthlnsPremCredits.pdf. Some states, such as D.C., have already
begun to implement this expanded coverage. See Letter from Ted Gallagher, Assoc. Reg'l Admin., Ctr.
for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to John McCarthy, Deputy Dir., Dep't of Health Care Fin. (June 22,
2010), availableat http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/MedicaidGenlnfo/downloads/
DC-10-03-Ltr.pdf.
56. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (2006) (stating that there is no TANF assistance for families
without a minor child); see also DEADBEATS OR DISADVANTAGED, supra note 11, at 5-6.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (2006).
58. 7 C.F.R. § 273.24 (2012); see also DEADBEATS OR DISADVANTAGED, supra note 11, at 6.
59. See DEADBEATS OR DISADVANTAGED, supra note 11, at 2-5; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-5-99-00390, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
FOR LOW-INCOME NON-CUSTODIAL PARENTS 8, 23 (2000).
60. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 59, at 8. This Article does not address the issue of
nonresident parents who are working in the informal economy and fail to disclose their employment to
resident parents or the court. When a resident parent is employed and not receiving TANF, the
nonresident parent's failure to disclose income yields an inappropriately low or minimal order of support.
However, remedies for uncovering and penalizing this type of misconduct differ from those offered in
this paper.
61. Daniel Meyer, Presentation at Institute for Research on Poverty Series: Child Support and Income
Insecurity (Nov. 18,2010), availableat http://www.irp.wisc.edu/newsevents/seminars/Presentations/20102011 /Meyer IRP-11-18-2010.pdf.
62. See, e.g., Amanda Geller & Marah A. Curtis, A Sort of Homecoming: Incarceration& the Housing
Security of Urban Men (Fragile Families, Working Paper WP1O-06-FF, 2010), available at http://crcw.
princeton.edulworkingpapers/WP l0-06-FF.pdf.
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from the formal economy entirely or have seen their earning capacity significantly diminished after release from prison."6 Those who are able to secure a job
are often relegated to low-wage, contract, or part-time positions that do not offer
medical benefits.M It is against this backdrop of struggle for subsistence that
low-wage earning parents attempt to support their children.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-SUPPORT PROVISIONS AND Low-INCOME ADJUSTMENTS
Recognizing that low-income obligors struggle to pay support while retaining
sufficient resources to subsist, many states have enacted self-support reserves or

low-income adjustments. At least thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia
have child support guidelines that contain subsistence provisions. The purpose

63. Cammett, supra note 6, at 153 ("In the aggregate, including all probationers, parolees, prisoners,
and jail inmates, America now holds more than 7.3 million adults under some form of correctional
control."); see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 5

(2009).
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS: SUMMARIES OF RESEARCH,
GRANTS, & PRACTICES 38 (2009), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/
dcl_09_26a.pdf. For example, a program in Pittsburgh to assist previously incarcerated nonresident
parents was unable to increase medical insurance coverage for children through employment of obligors
because so few of the employers offered health benefits. According to the report, "[w]age attachable
employment was achieved for 63 (78[%]) of the participants. However, only I of these participants had
an employer who provided health care benefits. The large number of positions that did not provide health
benefits is due in part to the types of jobs attained and, to a larger extent, the change in the economic
structure of the Pittsburgh area where more employers were hiring temporary or contracted workers." Id.
65. Venohr & Griffith, supra note 22, at 425 (these include: Alabama (ALA. R. JUDICIAL ADMIN.
32(c)(1), cmt. (2012)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25 app. (2012)); California (CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 4055(b)(7) (West 2003)); Connecticut (CONN. CHILD SUPPORT AND ARREARAGEs GUIDELINES v. (State of
Conn. Comm'n for Child Support Guidelines 2005), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/
ChildSupport/2005csguidelines.pdf); Delaware (DEL. FAM. CT. C.P.R. 509(b)(2) (West 2012)); District of
Columbia (D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(g)(1)(A) (2012)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30 (West 2012));
Hawaii (HAW. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINEs 23 (Haw. Child Support Enforcement Agency 2010), available
at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/form/maui/2CE248.pdf); Indiana (IND. R. CT., CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINE 1 (West 2012)); Iowa (IOWA CT. R. 9.3(2) (West 2012)); Kansas (Order Re: Kansas Child
Support Guidelines (Kan. 2012), available at http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-courts/supreme-court/
administrative-orders/Admin-order-261.pdf); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1 (2011)); Maine
(ME. REV. STAr. tit. 19-A, § 2006(5)(c) (2011)); Maryland (MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-204(e) (West
2012)); Massachusetts (MASS. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 3 (Mass. Admin. Office of the Trial Court
2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/childsupport/guidelines.pdf); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518A.42(1)(b) (2012)); Missouri (Mo. R. Civ. P. form 14 (West 2012)); Montana (MONT.
ADMIN. R. 37.62.114 (West 2012)) Nebraska (NEB. CT. R. § 4-218 (West 2012)); New Hampshire (N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §458-C:2(X) (2012)); New Jersey (N.J. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES R. OF PRACTICE app.
9-A(4) (West 2012)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-ll.1(B)(1) (2012)); New York (N.Y FAM.
CT. ACT § 413(6) (McKinney 2011)); North Carolina (N.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 2 (N.C. Admin.
Office of the Courts 2011), available at http://www.necourts.org/forms/documents/1226.pdf); Ohio
(OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.021 (West 2011)); Pennsylvania (PA. R. CIV. P. 1910.6 (West 2012));
Rhode Island (Order 2007-03 Re: Rhode Island Family Court Child Support Formula and Guidelines, at
*1 (R.I. Fam. Ct. 2007)); South Carolina (S.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES § 3.6 at 6 (Child Support
Enforcement Div., S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. 2006), available at http://www.state.sc.us/dss/csed/forms/
2006guidelines.pdf); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §25-7-6.10(2) (2012)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-12-205(4) (West 2012)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 653(7) (2012)); Virginia (VA. CODE
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of these provisions is to ensure that parents who owe support have sufficient
income to meet their own basic needs.6 6 The subsistence provisions take several
forms.
Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted a self-support
reserve (SSR) for nonresident parents.6 7 These reserves are typically tied to the
federal poverty guideline.6 8 If the income of a parent with a legal duty to support
ANN. § 20-108.2(3)(d) (2012)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.19.065(2)(b) (2012)); West Virginia
(W. VA. CODE § 48-13-403 (2012))). In arriving at these figures, Venohr and Griffith did not include
minimum order amounts below a fixed amount of income as low-income adjustments. Id.; see also U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIALS FOR ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

MANUAL (2002), availableat http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/css/essentialsfor attomeys-ch09.
pdf; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE MODELS BY MODEL TYPE

(2012), availableat http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid= 17621.
66. The self-support reserve test is intended to "verify that the noncustodial parent is financially able
both to pay the child support order and to maintain at least a minimum standard of living." ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN.

§ 25

app. (15) (2012); see also CONN. CHILD SUPPORT & ARREARAGE GUIDELINES 5 (State Of

Conn. Comm'n For Child Support Guidelines 2005), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/
ChildSupport/2005csguidelines.pdf.
67. See, e.g., VT. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 3 (Vt. Office of Child Support 2004), available at
http://dcf.vermont.gov/sites/dcf/files/pdf/ocs/GuidelinesSoleandSplit.pdf (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 656 (2003)) ("The final step is to calculate the obligated parent's ability to pay. If that parent's available
income is less than the self-support reserve or less than the obligated amount, or if paying the obligated
amount would reduce the noncustodial parent's income below the self-support reserve, the court may
deviate from the obligated amount."). The self-support reserve amounts range from $226 per month
(N.J. R. PRAcT APP. 9-A(7)(h) (West 2012)) to $851 per month (ALA. R. J. ADMIN. 32(c)(1), cmts. (2012))
to $1207 in D.C (D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(g)(1)(A) (2012)) to $1,257 (N.Y. DIv. OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS CHART (2012), available at https://www.childsupport.ny.gov/
dcse/pdfs/cssa_- 2012.pdf).
68. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(l)(b)(6) (McKinney 2011) ("'Self-support reserve' shall mean

one hundred thirty-five percent of the poverty income guidelines amount for a single person."); see also
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(d) (McKinney 2011) ("Where the annual amount of the basic child support
obligation would reduce the non-custodial parent's income below the poverty income guidelines amount
for a single person[,] ... the basic child support obligation shall be twenty-five dollars per month or the
difference between the non-custodial parent's income and the self-support reserve, whichever is
greater."). New York goes on to require that in situations in which the annual support obligation would
reduce the obligor's income below the self-support reserve but not below the poverty level for one, then
the basic support obligation is fifty dollars per month or the difference between the parent's income and
the self-support reserve. Id.; see also MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.62.126 (2012) ("Personal allowance is an

amount which reflects 1.3 multiplied by the federal poverty index guideline for a one person household.
This amount is deducted when determining child support. Personal allowance is a contribution toward,
but is not intended to meet the subsistence needs of parents."); NEB. CT. R. § 4-218 (West 2012) ("A
parent's support, child care, and health care obligation shall not reduce his or her net income below the
minimum of $908 net monthly for one person, or the poverty guidelines updated annually."); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 458-C:2, C:3 (2012) ("'Self-support reserve' means 115[%] of the federal poverty
guideline for a single person living alone."); OR. ADMIN. R. 137-050-0745(l)(b), (4) (2012) ("Calculate
the parent's income available for support by subtracting a self-support reserve of $1059 from the parent's
adjusted income; ... The amount of the self-support reserve (SSR) is based on the federal poverty
guideline (FPG), and is adjusted to account for estimated taxes using a 1.167 multiplier. (SSR = FPG x
1.167) The self-support reserve amount will be reviewed and updated annually.").
Some states do not use the FPL but, instead, tie self-support reserves to flat income rates or use other
measures that do not account for inflation. For example, Michigan uses a flat 10% rate for its low-income
equation. See 2008 MICH. CHILD SUPPORT FORMULA MANUAL 12 (Mich. State Court Admin. Office 2008);
see also STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS, supra note 9, at 2 (citing Venohr & Griffith, supra note 22).
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is equal to or less than the self-support reserve (usually some percentage of the
federal poverty guideline), then a court or administrative agency may deviate
from the presumptive child support award.' and order a nominal payment,
typically $50 per month. Some states require that a fixed minimum be awarded,
while other states leave the determination to the court's or administrative
agency's discretion. 70 If the nonresident parent earns more than the self-support
reserve amount, then that self-support amount is reduced from the parent's
income and the remaining amount is used to determine the child support award.7
While several states require the self-support reserve calculation discussed above,
some states simply incorporate a SSR into the state guideline's table of
predetermined child support amounts to be paid at varying income levels so that
the child support awards reflect the SSR adjustment.7 2
Even those states that have not adopted a SSR typically have a low-income
69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 61.30

(g)(6)(a) (West 2012) ("The obligor parent's child support

payment shall be the lesser of the obligor parent's actual dollar share of the total minimum child support
amount [or] ... 90[%] of the difference between the obligor parent's monthly net income and the current
poverty guidelines ... for a single individual living alone.").
70. Under the Minnesota guideline, if the obligor's gross income is less than 120% of the federal
poverty guideline for one person than the obligor is required to pay a minimum order of $50 for one or
two children and $75 for three or four children. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518A.42 l(d), 2 (West 2012). In
limited circumstances, the court has authority to deviate from the minimum. According to the guideline,
"[i]f the court finds the obligor receives no income and completely lacks the ability to earn income, the
minimum basic support amount under this subdivision does not apply." Id. at 2(b). See also MONT.
ADMIN. R. 37.62.126 (2012) (calculating Minimum Support Obligation by applying a minimum
contribution multiplier to the parent's income minus allowable deductions). In Nebraska, a minimum
support amount is recommended but not required. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-209 (West 2012) ("It is
recommended that even in very low-income cases, a minimum support of $50, or 10[%] of the obligor's
net income, whichever is greater, per month be set. This will help to maintain information on such
obligor, such as his or her address, employment, etc., and, hopefully, encourage such person to
understand the necessity, duty, and importance of supporting his or her children.").
71. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-916.01 (2012). Hawaii's guideline uses net income to determine child
support awards and net income is calculated by deducting taxes as well as an additional $791.00 to allow
for "poverty level self-support." HAW. CHILD Suppoir GUIDELINES 23 (Haw. Child Support Enforcement
Agency 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/form/mauil2CE248.pdf. Minnesota, for
example, requires that the court assess the obligor's ability to pay by "subtracting a monthly self-support
reserve equal to 120[%] of the federal poverty guidelines for one person from the obligor's gross
income." See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518A.42(b) (West 2012). Some of these provisions specify that if the
obligor's income is higher than the self-support reserve but lower than the lowest income level specified
on the state's child support schedule, the obligor is to pay the difference between his income and the SSR.
72. See, e.g., N.C. CHILD SupProir GUIDELINES 2 (N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts 2011) ("The
Guidelines include a self-support reserve that ensures that obligors have sufficient income to maintain a
minimum standard of living based on the 2009 federal poverty level for one person ($902.50 per month).
For obligors with an adjusted gross income of less than $999.00, the Guidelines require, absent a
deviation, the establishment of a minimum support order ($50). For obligors with adjusted gross incomes
above $999.00, the Schedule of Basic Support Obligations incorporates a further adjustment to maintain
the self-support reserve for the obligor."); see also PA. R. Ctv. P. 1910.16-1 cmt. D (West 2012) ("The
SSR is built into the schedule in Rule 1910.16-3 and adjusts the basic support obligation to prevent the
obligor's net income from falling below $867 per month"); S.C. CHILD SuPPoR GUIDELINES § 3.6, at 6
(Child Support Enforcement Div., S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. 2006) (incorporating a flat self-support

reserve of $748.00 per month. This amount does not fluctuate and is not tied to the Federal Poverty
Guideline); Wis. ADMIN. CODE DCF § 150.04(4) (2012) (using a child support schedule that incorporates
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adjustment; these provisions require adjudicators to deviate from the mandated
guideline amount or follow an alternative procedure when the obligor has very
limited resources. There is no automatic deduction from the nonresident
parent's income as with a SSR, but simply a threshold below which the parent's
income is deemed to be so low as to justify a significantly reduced child support
order.7 4 Judges and administrative decision-makers are either permitted to use
their discretion to determine a reasonable amount of child support7 5 or required to
impose a minimum support order when the parent's income falls below a certain
level.7 For example, according to the Idaho guidelines:
a low-income adjustment for obligors whose monthly income falls between 75% and 150% of the federal
poverty guideline).
73. See, e.g., IowA CT. R. 9.3(2) (West 2012) ("The basic support obligation amounts have been
adjusted ... for low-income obligated (noncustodial) parents .... The adjustment is based on the
following: (1) requiring a support order no matter how little the obligated parent's income is, (2)
increasing the support amount for more children, (3) maintaining an incentive to work for the obligated
parent, and (4) gradually phasing out the adjustment with increased income.") So, for example, a
noncustodial parent with $401-$500 per month in adjusted net income would be required to pay $40 per
month for one child and $50 per month for two or three children. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-11.1(J)
(West 2012) ("Whenever application of the child support guidelines . . . requires a person to pay another
person more than forty percent of the paying person's gross income for a single child support obligation
for current support, there shall be a presumption of a substantial hardship, justifying a deviation from the
guidelines."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-6.10(2) (2012) ("If the total amount of the child support
obligation, including any adjustments for health insurance and child care costs, exceeds fifty percent of
the obligor's monthly net income, it is presumed that the amount of the obligation imposes a financial
hardship on the obligor."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-12-211(2) (West 2012) (presumption of need to
include child care costs rebutted if child support combined with award of medical expenses exceeds 50%
of the obligor's adjusted gross income or if support, medical expenses and child care costs exceed 50% of
the adjusted gross income).
74. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-11.1(J) (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §25-7-6.10(2) (2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-12 (West 2012).
75. See, e.g., Alaska (ALASKA R. Div. P. 90.3(c) (West 2012)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-

15(i)(2)(B) (West 2011)), Idaho (IDAHO R. Civ. P. 6(c)(6) § 4(d) (West 2012), available at http://www.
isc.idaho.gov/files/ICSG-July_1_2012.pdf), Mississippi (2012 Miss. Laws 552 § 2(2)), Nevada (NEV.
REv. STAr. 125B.080(4) (2011)), North Dakota (N.D. CHILD SuPPoRr GUIDELINES §75-02-04.1-09 (N.D.
Supreme Court 2011)), Tennessee (TENN. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES

§

1240-2-4-.07(2)(f) (Child

Support Servs. Div., Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs. 2006)).
76. See IND. R. CT., CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE 2 (2010) ("For obligors with a combined weekly

adjusted income, as defined by these Guidelines, of less than $100.00, the Guidelines provide for a
case-by-case determination of child support. When a parent has extremely low-income the amount of
child support recommended by use of the Guidelines should be carefully scrutinized. The court should
consider the obligor's income and living expenses to determine the maximum amount of child support
that can reasonably be ordered without denying the obligor the means for self-support at a minimum
subsistence level. The court may consider $12.00 as a minimum child support order; however, there are
situations where a $0.00 support order is appropriate."); see also, e.g., FLA. STAr. ANN. § 61.30 (g)(6)(a)
(West 2012) ("If the obligor parent's net income is less than the amount in the guidelines schedule: 1.The
parent should be ordered to pay a child support amount, determined on a case-by-case basis, to establish
the principle of payment and lay the basis for increased support orders should the parent's income
increase. 2. The obligor parent's child support payment shall be the lesser of the obligor parent's actual
dollar share of the total minimum child support amount [or] .. . 90[%] of the difference between the
obligor parent's monthly net income and the current poverty guidelines ... for a single individual living
alone."); see also S.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 2 (Child Support Enforcement Div., S.C. Dep't of Soc.

Servs. 2006) ("In cases where the parents' combined monthly gross income is less than $750.00, the
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[i]f the monthly income of the paying parent is below $800.00, the Court
should carefully review the incomes and living expenses to determine the
maximum amount of support that can reasonably be ordered without denying a
parent the means for self-support at a minimum subsistence level. There shall
be a rebuttable presumption that a minimum amount of support is at least
$50.00 per month per child. 7
Self-support provisions and low-income adjustments typically apply only to
the nonresident parent. A few states either incorporate a self-support reserve for
both nonresident and resident parents78 or require a court to determine the impact
of a self-support reserve on the resident parent before applying the reserve to
determine the support obligation.7 9 Similarly, a minority of states consider the
financial situations of both parents when applying the low-income adjustment or
deviation standards. 0 However, the majority of subsistence provisions apply
only to the nonresidentparent.
III. EFFECT OF CURRENT GUIDELINES WHEN BOTH PARENTS ARE Low-INCOME

Child support is an important resource for low-income families that receive it.
According to data from the Census Bureau's 2009 Current Population Survey, the
additional income provided by child support helped lift a million people out of
poverty in 2008.8' Child support reforms enacted as part of PROWORA,

guidelines provide for a case-by-case determination of child support, which should ordinarily be set at no
less than $100.00 per month.").
77. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 6(c)(6) § 4(d) (West 2012). At least two states, Delaware and Pennsylvania,
address the issue of multiple families and the impact on the ability of the nonresident parent to support
himself. Pennsylvania, for example, reviews all of the nonresident parent's child support orders and
parent's net income in order to determine an amount of support that considers the parent's subsistence
needs. See Venohr & Griffith, supra note 22, at 425 (citing PENN. R. Civ. P. 1910.16-7 (West 2012). The
50% threshold is also the "withholding limit set out for orders of support by the income withholding set
out by the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968." Venohr & Griffith, supra note 22, at 425.
78. See, e.g., Delaware (DEL. FAM. CT. C.P.R. 509 (West 2012)), Hawaii (HAw. CHILD SUPPOr
GUIDELINES 23 (Haw. Child Support Enforcement Agency 2010), availableat http://www.courts.state.hi.us/
docs/form/mauil2CE248.pdf), Montana (MoNT. ADMIN. R. 37.62.114 (2012), and West Virginia. (W. VA.
CODE ANN. §48-13-403, at 1. 11 (West 2012)).
79. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25 app. (15) (2012).
80. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(d) (2012) ("Any calculation under this subdivision
shall not create or reduce a support obligation to an amount which seriously impairs the custodial parent's
ability to maintain minimal adequate housing and provide other basic necessities for the child. If the gross
income of either party is equal to or less than 150[%] of the federal poverty level . .. then the shared
custody support calculated pursuant to this subsection shall not be the presumptively correct support and
the court may consider whether the sole custody support or the shared custody support is more just and
appropriate.").
81. See SORENSEN, supra note 1, at 1. According to Sorensen's research, 625,000 children would have
been considered poor if they had not received support (decreasing child poverty by 4.4%) and 477,000 of
these children would have lived in profound poverty (below 50%of the federal poverty guideline) if they
did not receive child support. Id. The National Conference of State Legislatures has suggested that child
support "reduces the child poverty rate by 25 [%] among families that receive it, and accounts for 39[%]
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particularly the requirements that states develop improved paternity establishment procedures And new hires directories, have contributed to an increase in
child support for low-income children with single mothers.82 Over the past
decade, in large part due to welfare reform policies limiting access to public
assistance, TANF comprises a much lower percentage of poor families' incomes
and child support comprises a larger portion. Those families that are no longer
on TANF are entitled to receive child support collected by government child
support programs.84
Studies based on the National Survey of America's Families examined whether
child support reduces poverty." Data showed that child support comprised
approximately one-fourth of family income for poor families; however, there was
a distinction between TANF and non-TANF families. 8 6 Only 22% of poor
children on public assistance received child support in 1996, whereas 36% of
poor children in non-TANF households received child support. This support
comprised, on average, approximately one-third of the non-TANF family's
income.8 8 Researchers estimate that 39% of children in the United States would
be poor if they no longer received child support, whereas only 37% of children
whose households receive child support are considered poor.89 They conclude
that child support therefore reduces child poverty by approximately 5%.90
Another way to measure the impact of child support on the alleviation of
poverty is to look at its effect on the poverty gap. The poverty gap estimates the
amount of money that would be needed to bring individuals out of poverty. The
poverty gap for children who have a parent living outside of their home is
approximately $30.5 billion. 9 ' If child support is removed from the estimation,
then the poverty gap increases to $33 billion, which suggests that child support
diminishes the poverty gap by 8%.92
of family income for families that receive it." Letter from Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures to U.S.
Senate (Sept. 20, 2010), available at http://www.ncst.org/default.aspxtabid=21340.
82. SORENSEN & OLIVER, supra note 5, at 3.

83. SORENSEN, supra note 1, at 4. In 2007, an average of 9% of poor families' incomes was comprised
of TANF as compared to 21% in 1997. Id. For the very poor (families with income below 50% of the
poverty line), the percentage of income comprised of TANF funds decreased from 30 %in 1997 to 17%
in 2007. Id.
84. Id. at 2, 5.
85. Elaine Sorensen & Chava Zibman, To What Extent Do ChildrenBenefit From Child Support? New
Information From the National Survey ofAmerica's Families, 1997, Focus, Spring 2000, at 34, 36-37
[hereinafter New Information].
86. ELAINE SORENSEN & CHAVA ZIBMAN, URBAN INST., To WHAT ExTENT Do CHILDREN BENEFIT FROM
CHiLD SuPPORT? 6-7 (2000), availableat http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/ACF44.pdf.
87. New Information, supra note 85, at 36.
88. Id.
89. SORENSEN & ZIBMAN, supra note 86, at 10.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. New Information, supra note 85, at 37. In terms of income inequality and whether child support
helps narrow the divide, there is evidence to suggest that it does, but the effect is small. Id. Incomes for

wealthy families where one parent lives outside of the home are 4.8 times higher than the incomes of the
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Both measures illustrate that child support payments help reduce poverty for
those low-income families that actually receive it; however, state child support
guidelines do not generate awards that are high enough to significantly increase
the living standard of poor families.9 3 Once self-support reserves and lowincome adjustments are applied, support for families with a nonresident parent
whose income is at or near the poverty level can be reduced to $100 per month or
less.94 If parents do not have sufficient resources to provide support, then child
support establishment and enforcement will not significantly impact the family's
poverty status.
Researchers have recognized the limitation of current child support models for
responding to poverty-particularly when both parents are low-income. 9 5 They
cite the discrepancy between the assumption underlying child support policy that
families eligible for support are formerly married couples comprised of a primary
wage earner working a full-time job, 9 6 and the reality that many low-income
parents were never married and are not employed full-time. Even those
employed full-time, as discussed above, are often not earning enough to subsist.98
Of the three models used by states, only the Percentage of Income Model gives
both the child's interest in avoiding poverty and the parent's subsistence needs
equal weight. The Income Shares Model and the Melson Formula account for the
need to protect the nonresident parent from poverty through self-support reserves
before calculating a child support award. 99 Some argue that the lower support
awards resulting from these two models ultimately put more child support in the
hands of children on a consistent basis because the Percentage of Income Model
yields higher child support awards that low-income parents are unable to pay.oo

poorest families. Id. If child support is taken out of the equation, the difference is greater with wealthy
children having family incomes 5.2 times higher than the poorest children. Id.
93. Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT
FRONTIER, supra note 38, at 19.
94. See Pirog & Xu, supra note 9, at 2, 7. Using a simulation model in which the combined gross
monthly income for both parents is $1200 per month and the parents have two children, Pirog and Xu
compared guideline amounts using guidelines from states across the country and found significant
variation. Eleven states had guideline amounts of $50 or less; an additional eight states had guideline
amounts over $50 and less than $100; five more states had amounts above $100 and below $150; and the
remaining twenty-seven states had amounts between $150 and $366 per month. See id. at 7, 9; see also
DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 13, at 4; Jane C. Venohr, Ctr. for Policy Research, Presentation at the
Maryland Child Support Guidelines Review (Jan. 21,2008), availableat http://mdcourts.gov/family/pdfs/
conference/childsupportconference/008mdjan2l.pdf.
95. MAUREEN WALLER & ROBERT PLOTNICK, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., CHILD SUPPoRT AND
Low-INCOME FAMILIES: PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES, & POLICIES vi (1999), availableat http://www.ppic.org/
content/pubs/report/R_ 1199MWR.pdf.
96. Id.; see also Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in CHILD SUPORTr:
THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 38, at 19; Rothe & Meyer, supra note 27, at 60.
97. WALLER & PLOTNICK, supra note 95, at vi.
98. See supra text accompanying note 47; see also supra text accompanying notes 274-75.
99. See Pamela Foohey, Child Support & (In)ability to Pay: The Case for the Cost Shares Model, 13
U.C. DAVIS J. ON Juv. L. & POL'Y 35, 52-53 (2009).
100. See id. at 40-41.
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Regardless, self-support reserves and low-income adjustments are inconsistent
with the "continuity of expenditure" principle underlying support guidelines.'o'
When SSRs and adjustments are applied, the cost of supporting the children is not
shared equally or proportionately between two low-income parents.'O2
Dr. Maureen Pirog and her colleagues at the University of Indiana have
conducted longitudinal studies on the amounts of child support to be awarded
presumptively under state guidelines using different income level simulations. 0 3
She developed a hypothetical scenario and asked state child support officials to
identify the amount of child support a nonresident parent would be ordered to pay
under the state guidelines.10 4 In scenarios involving low-income or very
low-income parents,tos the amount of support to be ordered varies significantly
across the country.' 0 6 In 1997, the very low-income parent paid an average of
$126 per month, with a low of $0 and a high of $275 .107 In the low-income parent

101. See Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE
NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 38, at 19.

102. Rothe & Meyer, supra note 27, at 60. Rothe and Meyer point out that these efforts to provide
parents with basic subsistence resources may run counter to the "continuity of expenditure" goal of the
Income Shares model. Id. See also Ellman & Ellman, supra note 40, at 121 (suggesting that the reserves
reflect the "Earners Priority Principle" that every earner should be permitted to keep what they earn
unless there is a very good reason for the state or a third party to take a portion of such earnings).
According to Ellman and Ellman, "its power in the child support context varies with both the earner's
circumstances and the child's. This is because the economic circumstances of each bear on whether a
state-compelled transfer of resources is justified in the minds of most people." Ellman & Ellman, supra
note 40, at 121; see also Venohr & Griffith, supra note 22, at 426 (arguing that "[t]he self-support reserve
test for the nonresidential parent inadvertently establishes the precedent that that nonresidential parent's
basic needs should be considered before the child's basic needs.").
103. See Pirog & Xu, supra note 9, at 2-3.
104. The scenario used in the research is as follows: "Mother and father are divorced. Father lives
alone. Mother and the parties' two children, ages seven and thirteen, live together. Father pays union dues
of $30 per month and health insurance for the two children at $25 per month. Mother incurs monthly
employment-related childcare expenses of $150. There are no extenuating factors to be added or
considered for this unit. The gross combined monthly incomes for the family are as follows:
Case A - Combined $1,200 - Father $720 - Mother $480
Case B - Combined $2,500 - Father $1,500 - Mother $1,000
Case C - Combined $4,400 - Father $2,640 - Mother $1,760
Case D - Combined $10,500 - Father $6,300 - Mother $4,200." Id. at 2.
By 2009, these figures represented the 8th, 25th, 45th, and 82nd percentiles of income. Id. This data has
been collected biannually since 1988 with the exception of 2003. Id. at 1.
105. The very low-income parents have a combined income of $1200 per month (father $720, mother
$480) and the low-income parents have a combined income of $2500 per month (father $1500, mother
$1000). Id.
106. State agencies provided guideline figures for the low-income scenarios, however, many
acknowledged that the figures are variable because in these cases, courts have a great deal of discretion to
deviate from the guideline. Id. at 3.
107. Maureen Pirog et al., Interstate Comparisonsof Child Support Orders Using State Guidelines, 47

FAM. REL. 289, 289-91 (1998). The low-income family in the scenario has a monthly income of $1200
and the very low-income family has a combined monthly income of $830 ($300 is the mother's share and
$530 is the father's share). Id. at 289-90. The low award of $0 was based on the Connecticut guideline,
and the South Dakota guideline produced the highest award at $275 (59% of the NCP's gross income). Id.
at 291.
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scenario, support awards ranged from a low of $0 to a high of $327.os
The variation in support awards among states has increased over time. 0 9 In
2009, support awards at the very low-income level ranged from $0 in Arizona to
$366 in Oregon (50.8% of the obligor's income). 1 o In eleven states, the very
low-income obligor would be required to pay $50 or less per month."' In eight
states, the very low-income obligor would be required to pay $50--$100 per
month in child support.11 2 As Pirog points out, this variation reflects a lack of
consensus among states as to how to treat very low-income obligors and may be
attributed, in part, to the difference in the way states assess costs to parents for
expenses such as childcare." 3 However, Pirog's research demonstrates that there
has been a substantial decline in the percentage of income owed by the
lowest-income obligors.114
The data for the low-income (25th percentile) group reflects a different reality.
There was a small increase in the percentage of income that these parents paid in
support, from 26% in 1988 to 28% in 2009. The nonresident parent in this
scenario is earning $18,000, which is above the federal poverty guideline for one
person." 5 Montana reports the lowest guideline amount of $123 per month (8.2%
of income), whereas Tennessee has the highest award at $545 per month (36.3%

108. Rothe & Meyer, supra note 27, at 61. The Connecticut guideline again generated the lowest
award, whereas Indiana's guideline yielded the highest award of $327 (45.4% of the nonresident parent's
gross income). Id. (citing Pirog et al., supra note 107).
109.
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Guidelines Amounts in Child Support Cases
Median
Guideline
Amount

Standard
Deviation

$325 (IN) $202.84

$191.00

$78.06

$0 (AZ)

$366 (OR)

$166.69

$158.00

$101.75

1

$264 (UT)

$511 (CT)

$389.64

$391.00

$61.04

0

$123 (MT)

$545 (TN)

$412.07

$443.00

$99.12

N

Number
of Court
Discretion

Lowest
Monthly
Amount

1988

51

2

$27 (NY)

2009

51

0

1988

51

2009

51

Highest
Monthly
Amount

Mean
Guidelines
Amount

Case A

Case B

Pirog & Xu, supra note 9, at tbl.1.
I 10. Id. at 7, 9.
Ill. Id. at 9. The states are Arizona, Montana, New York, Washington, Vermont, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, Nebraska, Minnesota, Colorado, and the District of Columbia. Id.
112. Id. The states are Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Hawaii, Utah, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina. Id.
113. Id. at 7-8.
114. In 1988, the obligor's income in Case A fell at the 25th percentile, whereas in 2009 this same
income placed the obligor below the poverty line. Id. at 7. In the 2009 scenario, the very low-income
obligor earns $8640 per year ($720 per month), which falls significantly below the 2009 federal poverty
line of $10,830 for a single person. Id. at 3. The mean and median child support amounts have decreased
as well since 1988. Id. at 7.
115. Id. at 5.
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of income).' 1 6 In this scenario, the range of guideline awards, as well as the
average and median amounts, has increased since 1988.'17
Pirog's research demonstrates that while the percentage of income that
nonresident parents are required to pay has declined (particularly for very
low-income parents), the amount of net payments going to resident parents and
their children has significantly declined as well. According to Pirog:
The appropriate treatment of low-income obligors has never been fully
resolved by states. Guidelines amounts are regressive and the higher percentages of income required of low-income obligors has come under increasing
scrutiny. We know that high guideline amounts (those over 35[%] of income)
are associated with lower compliance rates, and are considered by some to be
poor public policy. However, simulations show that although lowering the
obligation rate for these nonresident parents may improve their compliance, it
does not fully offset the lowered obligation amounts and leads to a 30% net
payment loss for welfare resident parents and a 43% loss for nonwelfare
resident parents." 8
The burden to make ends meet in the face of these losses falls to the resident
parent. 1 9 Although some of this loss may be ameliorated through in-kind
contributions from the nonresident parent or his family, 12 0 the reduction in
payment amounts is significant. 1 2 1
Self-support reserves decrease the amount of child support available to
children. For example, prior to 2007, the District of Columbia Child Support

116. Id. at 8.
117. Id. In Pirog's view, "when there is simply not enough family income to support two households,
states have increasingly disagreed about the tactics to pursue in supporting low-income children." Id.
118. Id. at 16 (citations omitted) (citing Daniel R. Meyer, The Effect of Child Support on the Economic
Status of Nonresident Fathers, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 67-93 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998); I-Fen Lin, Perceived Fairnessand Compliance With Child
Support Obligation, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 388, 388-98 (2000); Judi Bartfeld & Daniel R. Meyer, Child
Support Compliance Among Discretionaryand NondiscretionaryObligors, 77 Soc. SERv. REV. 347,
347-72 (2003); Daniel R. Meyer & Judi Bartfeld, Compliance With Child Support Orders in Divorce
Cases, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 201, 201-12 (1996); Daniel R. Meyer & Judi Bartfeld, Are There Really
DeadbeatDads? The RelationshipBetween Ability To Pay, Enforcement, and Compliance in Nonmarital

Child Support Cases, 68 Soc. SERv. REv. 219, 219-35 (1994); Maureen Waller & Robert Plotnick,
Effective Child Support Policy for Low-Income Families: Evidence from Street Level Research, 20 J.
Pot'Y ANALYSIS & MGmT. 89, 89-110 (2001)).

119. See Pirog & Xu, supra note 9, at 16; see also Venohr & Griffith, supra note 22, at 426 (arguing
that "[t]he self-support reserve test for the nonresidential parent inadvertently establishes the precedent
that the nonresidential parent's basic needs should be considered before the child's basic needs.").
120. See Waller & Plotnick, supra note 41, at 14-15. In both TANF and non-TANF cases, the
noncustodial parent may have an informal arrangement with the custodial parent to provide in-kind or
cash assistance outside of the knowledge of the IV-D agency. See id.
121. Pirog & Xu, supra note 9, at 16. Most child support guidelines do not account for in-kind
contributions, so it is difficult to track the amount that parents are spending on in-kind expenses and
determine just how much of the burden shifts to the resident parent. See WALLER & PLOTNICK, supra note
95, at 57-58.
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Guideline utilized a Percentage of Income Model. 12 2 The Guideline incorporated
a low-income adjustment in which individuals earning less than $7500 per year
were presumptively ordered to pay $50.00 per month.1 2 3 All obligors earning
above this amount were required to pay a presumptive percentage of income so
long as the child support award did not bring the obligor below the poverty
line.12 4 An individual earning slightly above the poverty line would pay 20% of
their income for one child and 26% for two children.12 5 A nonresident parent
earning $14,404, for example, would be required to pay approximately $2800 per
year or $233 per month. In 2007, the District of Columbia adopted an income
shares model and incorporated a self-support reserve into its guideline. 26 The
self-support reserve is pegged at 133% of the poverty guideline.' 2 7 A single,
nonresident parent earning $14,484 per year would be required to pay $50 or less
per month in child support or approximately $600 per year.12 8 If the resident
parent were earning $14,484 per year as well, she would not be subject to a
self-support reserve, may not be eligible for TANF, and would need to provide all
financial support for the children exclusive of the $600 per year contribution of
the nonresident parent.129
Under the District of Columbia's Guideline, any individual earning above
133% of the federal poverty guideline would be able to deduct the self-support
reserve amount from his or her income before a child support award is
determined.1 3 0 The amount remaining after deduction of the self-support reserve

122. See D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(e)(2) (2001) (amended 2007).
123. D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(e)(2) (2001) (amended 2007) ("In level 1, a noncustodial parent with
income of $7,500 or below shall be considered unable to contribute the guideline percentage. A
noncustodial parent with gross income below $7,500 shall be treated on an individual basis and, in nearly
all cases, shall be ordered to pay at least a nominal sum of $50 per month. If the individual circumstances
permit, a noncustodial parent with an income below $7,500 shall be ordered to contribute more.").
124. Id. § 16-916.01(e)(3) (amended 2007) ("In level 2, a noncustodial parent with income that is not
less than $7,501 and not more than $15,000 per year, and whose income with application of the guideline
will not be below the poverty level, shall contribute the following percentage of income for basic child
support:
One child 20%
Two children 26%
Three children 30%
Four or more children 32%").
125. Id. An obligor earning $12,500 in 2002 would pay $2500 per year for one child or $208.00 per
month. The poverty guideline for one person in 2002 was $8860 and therefore, imposition of a $2500
child support award would not bring the obligor below the poverty line. The same obligor would pay
$3250 in support for two children or $271 per month. An obligor earning $18,500 in 2002 would pay
$3885 per year for one child or $324 per month, and $4995 for two children or $416 per month. See D.C.
CODE § 16-916.01(e)(3)-(4) (2012); 2002 HHS Poverty Guidelines, DEP'T HEALTH & HuM. SERVS.,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/02poverty.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
126. See D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(g)(1) (2012).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 16.916.01(g)(3), (m).

129. Id.
130. Id. § 16.916.01(m).
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would be the amount available for child support.131 For example, if a nonresident
and resident parent had one child and each parent earned $16,000 per year, the
basic child support obligation that each parent would be required to pay under the
District of Columbia's Guideline is $3298 per year or $275 per month. 1 3 2
However, once the self-support reserve of $14,484 is applied to the nonresident
parent's income, the nonresident parent would be required to pay $1516 per year
or $126 per month.13 3 The resident parent, who would not be eligible for TANF,
would be required to pay her share while assuming more than half of the share
that the nonresident parent would no longer be required to pay.
Even in states that pass through child support collected on behalf of TANF
recipients, there is modest benefit to low-income resident parents and their
children because, once the low-income adjustment or self-support reserve is
applied, the amount of support collected is negligible.1 34 In theory, the
pass-through amount should ease the burden faced by low-income custodial
parents and encourage nonresident parents to work because the money they pay
will go directly to their families.1 35 However, more generous pass-through
policies will not benefit families unless significant child support is collected.
There is a narrowing gap between the federal minimum wage earnings for
full-time employment and the poverty guideline: individuals with two children
131. Id. ("As the last calculation in the determination of child support, the judicial officer shall
calculate a low-income adjustment to ensure that the parent with a legal duty to pay support is able to
satisfy personal subsistence needs after the payment of child support. The judicial officer shall apply this
low-income adjustment after additions to and deductions from the parent's share of the basic child
support obligation have been made pursuant to subsections (i) through (1) of this section. The
low-income adjustment shall be calculated as follows: (1) Calculate a child support obligation for the
parent with a legal duty to pay support according to subsections (f) and (i) through (1) of this section.
(2) Determine the parent's maximum ability to pay child support by subtracting the self-support reserve
from the parent's adjusted gross income. If the remainder is negative or less than $600 per year, apply
subsection (g) of this section to determine the parent's child support obligation. (3) If the parent's
maximum ability to pay child support calculated under paragraph (2) of this subsection is greater than or
equal to $600 per year, compare the parent's maximum ability to pay child support to the child support
obligation calculated in paragraph (1) of this subsection. The parent's child support obligation shall be the
lesser of these 2 amounts.").
132. See id. § 16-916.01 app. I (Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations).
133. See id. § 16-916.01(m).
134. See, e.g., id. §§ 16-916.01 (g)(3), (m). The District of Columbia permits up to $150 of the monthly
amount collected to be passed through to TANF families. However, the self-support reserve is currently
pegged at $14,484 and a nonresident parent earning that amount or less typically owes $50 per month in
support. See id. § 16-916.01(g)(3). Therefore, there is only $50 to pass through, despite D.C.'s generous
pass-through provision. See id. In 2006, Congress enacted legislation designed to encourage states to pass
through collected child support funds to families. The law provides that states may pass through a certain
portion of funds to TANF recipients and the federal government will not take a share of these payments.
The state is to disregard this additional pass through amount when calculating TANF benefits. Several
states, including West Virginia, Washington, and Pennsylvania have adopted this flexible pass through.
See Josh Bone, States Should Distribute More Owed Child Support to Parents, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc.
Pot'Y (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.clasp.org/issues/in-focus?type=child-support-and-fathers&id=0002.
135. LAURA WHEATON & ELAINE SORENSEN, URBAN INST., THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF INCREASING
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS To TANF FAMILIES 2 (2007), availableat http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
411595_child support.pdf.
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working full-time (forty hours per week) at the federal minimum wage fall below
the poverty guideline for a family of three." 6 Therefore, even individuals
working full-time at minimum wage may qualify for a low-income adjustment or
minimum order.13 7
Proponents of subsistence protection for nonresident parents argue that
low-income parents cannot be expected to financially support their children
beyond a nominal amount and that the support of these children is a public
responsibility.138 However, advocates wary of the provisions recognize that
resident parents cannot rely on public assistance programs such as TANF to cover
their subsistence costs.' 3 9 The amount of TANF cash assistance grants varies
throughout the country, but only half of all states provide a maximum monthly
benefit award of at least $400, which amounts to approximately 20% of the
federal poverty guideline. 1 4 0 These benefits are insufficient to provide for the
basic needs of families.141 The United States has one of the highest poverty rates
and the lowest level of social spending in the developed world,14 2 with a far
weaker safety net than those in peer countries.1 4 3
Resident parents are less likely to rely on public assistance, given time limits

136. The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP'T LAB., http://www.dol.

gov/dol/topic/wages/minimumwage.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). An individual who works 40 hours
per week earns $290 per week or $15,080 per year. The federal poverty guideline for a family of three is
$19,090. See 2012 HHS Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://aspe.hhs.gov/

poverty/12poverty.shtml/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
137. Venohr & Griffith, supra note 22, at 426. The authors cite Washington State as an example of this
phenomenon. Id. In Washington, one out of five new support orders was set at the minimum order amount
of $25 per month. Id.
138. DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 13, at 10-11.

139. Id.
140. LADONNA PAVETTI & DOROTHY ROSENBAUM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, CREATING A
STAMP AND TANF
SAFETY NET THAT WORKS WHEN THE ECONOMY DOESN'T. THE ROLE OF
PROGRAMS 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412068_food-stamps-tanf.pdf.
141. Liz SCHOTr & IFE FINCH, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TANF BENEFITS ARE LOW AND
HAVE NOT KEPT PACE WITH INFLATION: BENEFITS ARE NOT ENOUGH TO MEET FAMILIES' BASIC NEEDS 1-5
(2010), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfmfa=view&id=3306.
142. ELISE GOULD & HILARY WETHING, EcON. POLICY INST., ISSUE BRIEF No. 339, U.S. POVERTY
RATEs HIGHER, SAFETY NET WEAKER THAN INPEER COUNTRIES 6 (2012), availableat http://www.epi.org/
files/2012/ib339-us-poverty-higher-safety-net-weaker.pdf/. The United States stands out as the country
with the highest poverty rate and one of the lowest levels of social expenditure-16.2% of GDP, well
below the vast majority of peer countries, which average 21.3% (unweighted). Id.
143. Id. ("[T]he pretax and transfer poverty rate in the United States in the late 2000s was 27.0[%],
while the post-tax and transfer rate was 17.3[%]. The difference, 9.7 percentage points, is how much the
U.S. tax and transfer system reduced the poverty rate. Among the peer countries in Figure F, the United
States' tax and transfer system does the least to reduce the poverty rate. In contrast, tax and transfer
programs reduced the poverty rate in France by 25.4 percentage points (from 32.6[%] to 7.2[%] post tax
and transfer). France's redistributive programs lowered poverty by about 2.5 times as much as those of
the United States. The (unweighted) average effect of peer countries' tax and transfer programs is a
poverty-rate reduction of 17.4 percentage points-an effect nearly two times greater than that produced
by such programs in the United States.").
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and other restrictions in the TANF program.'" Instead, they depend on earned
income, and a large number of resident parents have incomes below the poverty
level.145 The statistics for poverty in single-parent families are striking-almost
three in five of these families have incomes below twice the poverty level, and
single-parent families constitute over half (57.6%) of families living in poverty. 14 6 Single parents working full-time earn, on average, $19,900 per year-an
amount above the federal poverty level, but substantially below the threshold
identified by the Economic Policy Institute as the minimum a family of three (one
adult and two children) needs to cover median basic expenses.1 4 7 Most single
parents work less than full-time and earn far less than the federal poverty level.14 8
Researchers have found that "[t]he average child living in a low-income family
with a single parent is poor, even though 70[%] of the parents in these families

are working."l 4 9
Those resident parents working full-time often cannot meet the basic needs of
their families, particularly in urban areas with steep housing costs.15 0 The growth
in wages has not kept up with the increase in housing, healthcare, childcare, food,
and gasoline costs.' 5 ' Low-wage workers have few assets upon which to rely in
times of crisis, and an unexpected health problem or increase in housing costs can
plunge a family into bankruptcy, foreclosure, or homelessness.15 2 Those resident
parents who have lost a job during the recession may have to turn to TANF for
support; if they were working part-time or in seasonal employment prior to losing
their job, they may not be eligible for unemployment benefits.

144. See FY2010 Preliminary Report, supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also ELAINE
SORENSEN, URBAN INST., CHILD SUPPORT PLAYS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE FOR POOR CUSTODIAL
FAMILIES 2 (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412272-child-support-playsimportant-role.pdf ("Since 1996, the relative importance of child support and earnings has increased
while cash assistance for poor and deeply poor custodial families makes up a substantially smaller part of
family income.").
145. See Combating Poverty: UnderstandingNew Challengesfor Families: Hearing Before the Sen.
Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 2, 6 (2012) (statement of Ron Haskins, Co-Director, Center on Children and
Families, Brookings Institution). According to Haskins, "[I]f wages do not improve at the bottom, all
single parents with two or more children at or below the 10th percentile-and even many above the 10th
percentile-will always be in poverty if earnings are their only income." Id. at 2.
146. SHEILA ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., URBAN INST., A NEW SAFETY NET FOR Low-INCOME FAMILIES 3 (2008),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411738 new-safety-net.pdf.
147. Id. at 4; see also JARED BERNSTEIN & JAMES LIN, EcoN. POLICY INST., WHAT WE NEED TO GET BY.
A BASIC STANDARD OF LIVING COSTS $48,778, AND NEARLY ATHIRD OF FAMILIES FALL SHORT 13 (2008),
available at http://www.epi.org/page/-/old/briefingpapers/224/bp224.pdf/.
148. ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., supra note 146, at 4. Single parents, on average, earned $10,730 in 2006,
which is below the federal poverty level for a household of three. If all single parents with no earnings are
omitted from this calculation, then single parents earned, on average, $15,280, which is still under the
2006 poverty level ($16,242) for a family of three. Id.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 5-6.
151. Id. at 6.

152. Id. at 1-2.
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The rationale that resident parents have sufficient income and benefits to
support their families, thereby justifying self-support reserves and low-income
adjustments for nonresident parents, is problematic. While these subsistence
provisions are designed to address the significant need of low-income nonresident parents, they have the unintended effect of increasing the burden on
low-income resident parents and children.15 3
IV. SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM REMEDIES

A. Refining the Application of Self-Support Reserves
Legislatures and courts must rectify the imbalance inherent in guidelines that
apply self-support reserves and low-income adjustments solely to the nonresident
parent's income, without consideration of the impact of such adjustments on the
resident parent and children. An approach that accounts for the income, public
benefits, and additional resources available to both parents is a more equitable
method for ensuring that children whose parents have minimal financial
resources receive support.' 54
Family law scholars, such as Ira Ellman, argue that for low- or very
low-income parents, the child support system is "arguably unimportant."15 5
According to Ellman, "[i]f neither parent has much money, the child's well-being
depends on finding a third source of funds, whether a new spouse for one of the
parents, private charity, or a public income-support system. Moving money
around among desperately poor households cannot contribute much to social

welfare."l

56

While Ellman's assessment is accurate, it does not deal with the reality that
alternative sources of funds are unavailable or insufficient to support poor
families and are increasingly under threat of being reduced. Under these
circumstances, the inequities and narrow definitions built into self-support
reserves and low-income adjustments intensify an already precarious situation.
Instead, subsistence provisions in state child support guidelines should require a
153. DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 13, at 11.
154. Courts have recognized that absolute application of self-support reserves without consideration
of deviations permitted under guidelines is inappropriate. See, e.g., Carey v. Carey, 615 A.2d 516, 518
(Conn. App. Ct. 1992) ("Although the trial court correctly recognized that the guidelines generally are not
applicable to parents with a weekly net income below the self-support reserve of $135, the trial court
failed to consider the entire mandate of the guidelines. They state that '[e]xcept as provided under the
deviation criteria, the guidelines do not apply to a parent whose net weekly income is less than $135.' As
a result, even where income does not exceed the self-support reserve, the guidelines are applicable and
must be considered 'as provided under the deviation criteria."') (citation omitted). This Article does not
endorse the current poverty guideline as an effective measure of poverty in the United States. Other
measures are currently under consideration to better assess the nature of poverty in various regions of the
country, taking into account housing and other significant costs. However, this Article continues to use
the federal poverty guideline since no other alternative measures are being implemented at this time.
155. Ellman & Ellman, supra note 40, at 121.
156. Id.
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holistic assessment of low-income parents' capacity to financially support their
children.
A handful of states have adopted a more evenhanded approach.157 In these
states, either a self-support reserve or low-income adjustment applies to both
parties, or the guideline gives judges or administrative agencies discretion to
consider the financial resources available to both households.' 58 In a few states,
the court or adjudicative body is permitted to deviate from the presumptive
guideline amount or disregard the percentage of income limits in order to protect
the best interests of children and equalize responsibility between low-income
parents.' 59
Five states have adopted SSRs for both parents.' 6 0 Montana, for example, has
incorporated personal allowances into its guideline calculation.16 ' The personal
allowance, 1.3 times the federal poverty guideline for a one-person household, is
deducted from each parent's income.1 6 2 The statute emphasizes that this
allowance "[i]s a contribution toward, but is not intended to meet the subsistence
needs of parents."' 6 3 This approach, however, offers little relief to the resident
parent when both parents are very low-income. If the nonresident parent is only
required to pay a nominal amount of child support once a self-support reserve is
applied, then applying a self-support reserve to a low-wage earning resident
parent's income may reduce her support contribution on paper; however, in
reality, she will spend a higher percentage of her income to support their children.
The more income the resident parent earns, the more impact the dual personal
157. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-13-403 (2012) (line 11); DEL. FAM. CT. R. CIv. P. 509 (West 2012)
(Child Support Formula Numerical Values); N.J. CT. R. app. 9-A(7)(h) (West 2012), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/csguide/app9a.pdf (Considerations In the Use of Child Support Guidelines); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.62.114 (2012); HAW. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 23 (Haw. Child Support
Enforcement Agency 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/form/mauil2CE248.pdf.;
2008 MICH. CHILD SUPPORr FORMULA MANUAL 10-12 (Mich. State Court Admin. Office 2008), available
at http://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Manuals/focb/
2008MCSFmanual.pdf).
158. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-13-403 (2012) (line 11); DEL. FAM. CT. R. Civ. P. 509 (West 2012)
(Child Support Formula Numerical Values); N.J. CT. R. app. 9-A(7)(h) (West 2012), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/csguide/app9a.pdf (Considerations In the Use of Child Support Guidelines); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.62.114 (2012); HAW. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 23 (Haw. Child Support
Enforcement Agency 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/formi/maui/2CE248.pdf.;
2008 MICH. CHILD SUPPORT FORMULA MANUAL 10-12 (Mich. State Court Admin. Office 2008), available
at http://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Manuals/focb/
2008MCSFmanual.pdf).
159. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055(b)(7) (West 2003).
160. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-13-403 (2012) (line 11); DEL. FAM. CT. R. Civ. P. 509 (West 2012)
(Child Support Formula Numerical Values); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.62.114 (2012); HAW. CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES 23 (Haw. Child Support Enforcement Agency 2010), availableat http://www.courts.state.hi.us/
docs/form/maui/2CE248.pdf.; 2008 MICH. CHILD SUPPORT FORMULA MANUAL 10-12 (Mich. State Court
Admin. Office 2008), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/
Documents/Publications/Manuals/focb/2008MCSFmanual.pdf).
161. MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.62.114 (2012).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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allowance provision has on equalizing the percentage of income paid by each
parent to support the children.'6
Some states require judges or administrative agencies to determine the impact
of a self-support reserve on the resident parent before applying the reserve to the
nonresident parent's income. Arizona's guideline, for example, requires the court
to apply a self-support reserve to the income of the parent owing support.165 The
court may reduce the support amount based on the self-support reserve, but only
after considering the impact on the resident parent. If the resident parent also has
insufficient resources to be self-supporting, then the court may use its discretion
to determine whether or not to reduce the nonresident parent's support obligation,

and by how much. 1 6 6
New Jersey has taken a different approach. The state implemented a
self-support reserve for nonresident parents who, if required to pay the
presumptive guideline amount, would have income that falls below 105% of the
poverty guideline.16 7 The goal of the self-support reserve is to ensure that the
parent has funds available to meet his basic needs and has an incentive to

164. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §48-13-403 (2012) (line 11); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.62.114 (2012); 2008
MICH. CHILD SupPoRr FORMULA MANUAL 10-12 (Mich. State Court Admin. Office 2008), available at

http://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Manuals/focb/
2008MCSFmanual.pdf). Applying self-support reserves to both parents can have more of an impact if the
resident parent is earning more money. Without the self-support reserve, the resident parent's income
would offset and lower the amount that the nonresident parent is required to pay.
165. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25 app. (15) (2012) ("In each case, after determining the child support
order, the court shall perform a Self Support Reserve Test to verify that the noncustodial parent is
financially able both to pay the child support order and to maintain at least a minimum standard of living,
as follows: Deduct $903 (the Self Support Reserve amount) from the noncustodial parent's Adjusted
Gross Income .... If the resulting amount is less than the child support order, the court may reduce the
current child support order to the resulting amount after first considering the financial impact the
reduction would have on the custodial parent's household (emphasis added). The test applies only to the

current child support obligation, but does not prohibit an additional amount to be ordered to reduce an
obligor's arrears.
EXAMPLE: Before applying the Self Support Reserve Test, the child support order is calculated under
the guidelines to be $162. The adjusted gross income of the noncustodial parent is $978. Subtracting the
self-support reserve amount of $903 from the noncustodial parent's adjusted gross income of $978 leaves
$75. Because this resulting amount is less than the $162 child support order, the court may reduce the
child support order to the resulting amount. However, before making any reduction, the court shall
examine the self-support capability of the non-paying parent, using the same Self Support Reserve Test
applied to the noncustodial parent.
In this example, the non-paying parent's proportionate share of the total child support obligation is
calculated under the guidelines to be $222. This parent's Adjusted Gross Income is $950. Subtracting the
self-support reserve of $903 from the non-paying parent's Adjusted Gross Income of $950 leaves $47.
Because this resulting amount is less than the parent's proportionate share of the Total Child Support
Obligation, it is evident that both parents have insufficient income to be self-supporting. In this situation,
the court has discretion to determine whether and in what amount the child support order (the amount the
noncustodial parent is ordered to pay) may be reduced.").
166. Id.
167. N.J. CT. R. app. 9-A(7)(h) (West 2012) (Considerations in the Use of Child Support Guidelines),
availableat http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/csguide/app9a.pdf.
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work.168 However, this adjustment is only applied if the resident parent's income
is above 105% of poverty.' 6 9 The rule provides that:
[t]he court shall carefully review the obligor's income and living expenses to
determine the maximum amount of child support that can reasonably be
ordered without denying the obligor the means of self-support at a minimum
subsistence level. If an obligee's income is less than 105% of the poverty
guideline, no self-support reserve adjustment shall be made regardless of the
obligor's income.1o
This last provision is designed "[t]o ensure that custodial parents can meet their
basic needs so that they can care for the children." 7 1
A few states have enacted low-income adjustments or percentage of income
limits that include safeguards for resident parents. The court can disregard or
limit the adjustment to protect the financial well-being of resident parents and
children. Washington, for example, requires that neither parent's child support
obligation exceed 45% of his or her net income.17 2 However, before applying the
45% rule, courts in Washington must consider:
[w]hether it would be unjust to apply the limitation after considering the best
interest of the child and circumstances of each parent. Such circumstances
include . . .leaving insufficient funds in the custodial parent's household to
meet the basic needs of the child, comparative hardship to the affected
households, assets or liabilities, and any involuntary limits on either parent's
earning capacity including incarceration, disabilities, or incapacity.17 3

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. app. 9-A(20)(a). A child support award is adjusted to reflect the self-support reserve only if its
payment would reduce the obligor's net income below the reserve and the custodial parent's (or the
Parent of the Primary Residence's) net income is greater than 105% of the poverty guideline. Id.
171. Id. app. 9-A(7)(h). Dr. Jane Venohr, an economist with the Center for Policy Research and a
leading expert on child support who has worked with over twenty-five states to develop and revise their
guidelines, points out that New Jersey does not apply the SSR in TANF cases because the resident parents
eligible for TANF have incomes below 105% of poverty. The result of this threshold is that nonresident
parents end up paying a higher level of child support to the state in cases in which the resident parent has
assigned rights to support to the state. E-mail from Jane C. Venohr, Ctr. for Policy Research (Oct. 30,
2012) (on file with author).
172. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.065(1) (LexisNexis 2012). Washington also applies a SSR of
125% to the obligor's net income:
When a parent's monthly net income is below one hundred twenty-five percent of the federal
poverty guideline, a support order of not less than fifty dollars per child per month shall be
entered unless the obligor parent establishes that it would be unjust to do so in that particular
case. The decision whether there is a sufficient basis to deviate below the presumptive
minimum payment must take into consideration the best interests of the child and the
circumstances of each parent.
Id. § 26.19.065(2)(a).
173. Id. § 26.19.065(l)(b).
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The Tennessee Child Support Guideline mandates that "[n]o deviation in the
amount of the [presumptive] child support obligation shall be made which
seriously impairs the ability of the PRP [primary residential parent] ... to maintain minimally adequate housing, food, and clothing for the children being
supported by the order and/or to provide other basic necessities."1 7 4
Hawaii's guideline recognizes the negative impact that allowing a low-income
adjustment for the nonresident parent can have on the resident parent. In
discussing exceptional circumstances under which a court or the administrative
agency may deviate from the presumed amount, the guideline states that the
adjudicator may limit child support to 70% of the obligor's net income.'7
However, this 70% rule is qualified by the following language:
[i]t may not always be appropriate to apply this exceptional circumstance. For
example, when both parents' incomes are similar, it may be inequitable for the
non-custodial parent to reduce his/her obligation to the child(ren) while the
custodial parent does not receive any reduction in his/her obligation to the
child(ren). Additionally, the custodial parent's obligation is essentially increased by the percentage that the obligor is not required to pay over 70% of net
income.' 7 6
Hawaii acknowledges what few other states do: that the child's basic needs do not
change and therefore the resident parent must compensate for the reduction in the
nonresident parent's support or the child's basic needs will go unmet. 7 7
California has adopted a rebuttable presumption that a low-income adjustment
should be applied to the nonresident parent's income.' 7 8 If that parent has less
than $1000 per month in net disposable income, then the adjudicator presumes
that the nonresident parent is entitled to a low-income adjustment. 179 This
presumption can be rebutted, however, by evidence that applying the adjustment
would be unjust or inappropriate. so Such evidence can include the impact the
adjustment would have on the net income of the resident parent.'8

174. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 1240-02-04-.07(1)(d) (2012). Low-income is defined as annual gross
income at or below the federal poverty level for a single person. Id. § 1240-02-04-.07(f).
175. HAw. CHILD SuPPoRr GUIDELINES 11 (Haw. Child Support Enforcement Agency 2010).
176. Id.
177. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that Hawaii's guidelines do not require the obligor to pay
any child support until he reaches the $1050.01-1100.00 per month gross income range. At this level, the
obligor's net income is calculated at $9.00 and 70% of net is $6.00 per month in support. See id at app. D;
see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-13-702(b)(8)(A) (LexisNexis 2012) (noting that a possible basis for
deviation from the guidelines includes "[wihether the total of spousal support, child support and child
care costs subtracted from an obligor's income reduces that income to less than the federal poverty level
and conversely, whether deviation from child support guidelines would reduce the income of the child's
household to less than the federal poverty level.").
178. CAL. FAM. CODE §4055(b)(7) (West 2003) (amended 2012).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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Two states have tried a different mechanism for balancing the subsistence
needs of low-income parents and children-the "equalize income method." 18 2 In
this approach, the guideline incorporates a minimum order amount that is based
on equalizing income between two parents who are capable of working full-time
at minimum wage. 18 3 For example, if the after-tax, net monthly income for the
nonresident parent is $1500 and the resident parent's net monthly income is
$1000, then the child support award would be set at $250 per month to equalize
the parents' incomes at $1250.184 South Dakota and Colorado adopted the
equalization of income approach, although neither state continues to use the
original model.'
The state guidelines discussed above account for the subsistence needs of
low-income parents while recognizing the potential negative impact that
self-support reserves and low-income adjustments can have on children living at
or near the poverty line. While these guidelines are an improvement over
guidelines that apply self-support reserves solely to the nonresident parent's
income, they do not provide sufficient guidance to judges and administrative
agencies tasked with determining a fair amount of support. This lack of guidance
is likely to lead to highly variable and unpredictable child support awards.
Child support guidelines should delineate the factors to consider when
applying self-support reserves and low-income adjustments, or when deviating
from percentage of income or low-income thresholds. Forms should be developed to guide litigants in presenting relevant evidence. For example, consideration should be given to the living circumstances of both parties, including
whether either parent is sharing living costs with someone else or receives free
transportation.' 86 Adjudicators should also consider whether either parent
182. Jane C. Venohr, Ctr. For Policy Research, Presentation on Income Shares Child Support
Guidelines and Other Guidelines Issues, at 21 (Mar. 9, 2009), availableat http://www.childsupportillinois.

com/assets/120810_csadvvenohr.pdf. According to Dr. Venohr, this approach requires equalizing
"after-tax, after-benefit, after-child support income between the parents assuming they are both earning
min[imum] wage." E-mail from Dr. Jane Venohr, Ctr. for Policy Research (Oct. 30, 2012) (on file with
author); see also PAUL LEGLER, POLICY STUDIES, INC., Low-INCOME FATHERS AND CHILD SUPPORT:
STARTING OFF ON THE RIGHT TRACK 12 (2003), available at http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/
starting%20off.pdf.
183. Conversation with Jane C. Venohr, Ctr. for Policy Studies (Nov. 2, 2012) (notes on file with
author).
184. Id Dr. Venohr offered this hypothetical to illustrate the application of the equalize income
method.
185. Id. According to Dr. Venohr, the formula in Colorado has not been adjusted to reflect the increase

in federal minimum wage. South Dakota abandoned the model when the federal minimum wage
increased. However, Dr. Venohr believes that this approach, with modifications to account for minimum
wage increases and other tax credit and benefits changes, still holds promise for balancing more
effectively the obligations and standards of living for low-income parents. Id.
186. An evaluation of the New York Strengthening Families Project revealed that over half of the
noncustodial parent participants in the project (52%) lived with relatives or friends and did not pay rent.
See TESs G. TANNEHILL ET AL., URBAN INST., STRENGTHENING FAMILIES THROUGH STRONGER FATHERS
INITIATIVE 14-15 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001412-stronger-fathersinitiative.pdf.
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provides in-kind resources or services to the children (such as a nonresident
parent regularly providing food, diapers, or child care services) and credit such
contributions when determining child support obligations.187
The fact finder should elicit information concerning the public benefits
available to either party such as TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid, as well as
subsidies for child care or housing. Income enhancements such as child care,
dependency, and earned income tax credits should be factored into the
calculation. Rather than simply assuming that the custodial parent has a public
benefits safety net upon which to rely, the court should carefully assess the
circumstances of each case.
If the custodial parent is receiving TANF, then the court or administrative
agency should consider the impact that the self-support reserve or low-income
adjustment will have on the "pass through" amount that the family is entitled to
receive.'18 Twenty-five states pass through anywhere from $50 to $200 per
month of child support collected to families receiving TANF benefits.' 8 9
Self-support reserves and low-income adjustments for nonresident parents divert
money that might otherwise be passed through to the resident parent. The resident
parent is already struggling to provide for the children with insufficient TANF
funds, and the self-support reserve or low-income adjustments may have the
effect of removing the only additional monthly income that the resident parent is
allowed to receive without losing TANF benefits.
State child support guidelines already define certain in-kind resources as a
form of income and contain the mechanisms for imputing income.' 90 These
guidelines generally exclude means-tested benefits as countable income; 9 '
however, an exception could be carved out for determining whether to apply
self-support reserves and low-income adjustments.
One potential problem with this approach is that it requires courts and
administrative tribunals to expend more resources establishing child support
orders.1 9 2 This case-by-case analysis may require discovery of documents, taking
187. In states where TANF recipients are required to report receipt of these types of in-kind benefits,
the ability to generate evidence or testimony on these resources may be limited.
188. Under federal law, states have the option to pass through up to $200 per month in child support
collected to families receiving TANF. U.S. Gov'TACcOuNTABtLrfY OFFICE, GAO-11- 196, CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT: DEPARTURES FROM LONG-TERM TRENDS IN SOURCES OF COLLECTIONS AND CASELOADS

REFLECT RECENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 8, 22 (2011). If they do so, the state is not required to provide the
federal government with its typical share of the amount collected. Id. The state may also disregard the
amount of support passed through when determining the families' TANF eligibility. Id. at 22.
189. Id. at 22-24.
190. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25 app. (5)(A) (2012); D.C. CODE §16-916.01(d)(1)(R) (2012);
GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
191. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25 app. (5)(B) (2012); D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(d)(6) (2012);
GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-6-15(f)(2)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
192. Dr. Venohr acknowledges the merits of the Arizona-style, case-by-case analysis, but raises

concerns about the feasibility of its application. See Conversation with Jane C. Venohr, Ctr. for Policy
Studies (Nov. 2, 2012) (notes on file with author); E-mail from Dr. Jane Venohr, Ctr. for Policy Research
(Oct. 30, 2012) (on file with author).
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of testimony, and detailed, written fact-finding which could burden state agencies
and courts. 19 3 Nevertheless, a more comprehensive inquiry has the potential to
yield a result which equitably allocates the burden of supporting children
between two low-income earners.
States that have implemented mechanisms for considering the relative
financial circumstances of both low-income parents balance the need to preserve
a subsistence allowance for nonresident parents with the need to moderate the
impact that such an allowance has on low-income resident parents and
children. 1 9 4 These provisions are also consistent with the "continuity of
expenditure" principle underlying child support guidelines. Developing clearer
standards for adjudicators to use in evaluating available resources would lead to
greater consistency as well as provide assurance that the resulting child support
awards are equitable. While the financial impact of these more balanced
provisions in very low-income families may be marginal,19 5 such provisions
recognize that the financial burden of supporting children should not shift to the
primary residential parent.
B. Enhancing EarningCapacity and Income Generation
Application of subsistence provisions to both parents' incomes and thorough
analysis of resources available to resident and nonresident parents enhance the
integrity of child support guidelines. However, such reforms do little to improve
the overall ability of low-income parents to support their children and escape
poverty. 19 6 Even if these guideline improvements equalize the playing field and
yield a higher amount of child support, there is a significant risk that low-wage
earners will not be able to satisfy their obligations.' 9 7 Structural, long-term

193. See Conversation with Jane C. Venohr, Ctr. for Policy Studies (Nov. 2, 2012) (notes on file with
author); E-mail from Dr. Jane Venohr, Ctr. for Policy Research (Oct. 30, 2012) (on file with author).
194. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25 app. (15) (2012).
195. See, e.g., id. Even if higher child support awards could mean that more money will transfer to
low-income families, it is also possible that such provisions will lead to the accrual of arrearage and
disincentives for low-income, nonresident parents to stay in the formal job market.
196. See MOSES ET AL., supra note 5, at 15; see also Mavis Maclean & Andrea Warman, A
ComparativeApproach to ChildSupport Systems, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 38,
at 176 (comparing child support systems in other countries).
197. Daniel R. Meyer, Presentation: Child Support and Income Insecurity (Nov. 18, 2010), at 23. In
their analysis of national Fragile Families data, as well as administrative records from the state of
Wisconsin, Meyer and Cancian found that 14% of those entitled to support did not receive it within the
year, while 41% received support irregularly. Id. The efforts of the federal and state governments to
collect more child support have yielded disappointing results. Id. The Census Bureau national data on
child support awards and payments has changed relatively little over a thirty-year period. In 1978, 59% of
mothers eligible to receive support had support orders, and about half of those mothers received full child
support payments. Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in CHILD SUPPORTM
THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 38, at 17. The average value of this child support was $3865, which was
less than half of what economists determined was the typical amount needed to rear children at that time.
Id. at 17. In 1991, 56% of eligible parents had received support orders and about half received the full
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solutions are needed to improve earning capacity and expand resources for
low-income parents.'"
Advocates and policymakers cannot look to state child support agencies to
take the lead on initiatives to reduce poverty. These agencies have a dual mission
to collect child support for families while also collecting support to reimburse the
state for the costs of welfare payments.' 99 The federal child support agency has
been shifting the mission of the program and tipping the balance in favor of
supporting families rather than reimbursing the state.2 0 However, state agencies
have not fully adopted this new mission.20 ' In addition, federal performance
standards require state child support agencies to prioritize establishment and
enforcement of orders over quality of those orders.202 For example, child support
agencies must meet standards regarding the number of child support orders
established and the amount collected, or else face penalties.2 0 3 The standards do
not mandate that these orders be sufficient to maintain a certain standard of
living. They primarily incentivize establishing new orders and collecting
support. 2 04 As a result, agencies have an interest in maintaining self-support
amount they were supposed to receive. Id. The average value of the payment was $3011, which
constituted less than half of what economists determined was needed to rear children. Id.
198. See DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 13, at 10 ("When both parents have very limited resources,

policies concerning the transfer of child support income must be supplemented by policies that increase
the income and resources of both parents to ensure children an adequate standard of living."); see also
MOSES Er AL., supra note 5, at 16. Low-income women recognize this connection. The Center for Family
Practice and Policy held listening sessions with low-income African-American and Latina women. The
women emphasized that low-income men need social services:
They expressed many reasons for their belief that social service provision for men in
low-income communities is essential, among them the need for their communities to have
stable employed adults, for children to see their fathers and other men as self-sufficient and
secure. But perhaps the most important reasons they gave was that under current social welfare
policy, men cannot do their part to support their families through these programs. They cannot
make their equal contribution to their families because they cannot support themselves or their
children.
Id. at 15.
199. Daniel Hatcher, ChildSupport Harming Children:Subordinatingthe Best Interests of Children to
the FiscalInterests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1048-49 (2007); see also Daniel Hatcher
& Hannah Lieberman, Breaking the Cycle of Defeat for "Deadbroke" Noncustodial Parents Through
Advocacy on ChildSupport Issues, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 5, 9 (2003).
200. Hatcher, supra note 199, at 1033, n.25; OFFICE OF CHILD SuPPoar ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2005-2009, at 1

(2004), availableat http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2004/Strategic PlanFY2005-2009.pdf.
201. Hatcher, supra note 199, at 1048 ("Child support is no longer primarily a welfare reimbursement,
revenue-producing device for the Federal and State governments; it is a family-first program, intended to
ensure families' self-sufficiency by making child support a more reliable source of income.") (quoting
FY2010 PreliminaryReport, supra note 20). Hatcher argues that welfare reimbursement remains a goal
of state agencies; however, declining TANF caseloads have limited the amount that agencies collect
toward reimbursement. Hatcher, supra note 199, at 1032, 1069.
202. Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-200, 112 Stat. 645
(1998).
203. Id. at 645-51.
204. Id. at 651.
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reserves because they may facilitate an increase in the amount of support
collected, which in turn helps the state government meet its performance
standards regardless of the strength of the orders.2 05
Although a number of state child support agencies have developed pilot
projects or collaborations with employment agencies and public welfare,20 6 these
programs are not the norm because child support agencies cannot use their
federal funding to support employment-related projects unless they receive a
waiver, 20720 a specialized grant,20 8 or participate in a demonstration project
sponsored by the federal government. 20 9 Generally, funds are to be used on child
support collection and enforcement. 21 0 This approach may be changing with
increased recognition at the federal level that employment assistance and child
support collection are linked. For example, the federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement has initiated a new grant program that awards innovation grants to
child support agencies partnering with employment programs. 211

205. Id. at 645-51. See Child Support Enforcement Program; Incentive Payments, Audit Penalties, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,178, 82,181 (Dec. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 302, 304-05). The final rule
implements sections of the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998.
206. See e.g., DANIEL SCHROEDER & NICHOLAS DOUGHTY, RAY MARSHALL CTR., TEXAS NONCUSTODIAL PARENT CHOICES: PROGRAM IMPACT ANALYSIs 1 (2009), available at http://www.utexas.edul

research/cshr/pubs/pdfINCP ChoicesFinalSep_.03_2009.pdf. The Texas Office of the Attorney General,
the Texas Workforce Commission, and Texas child support courts joined together to implement a pilot
project in five sites throughout the state.
207. See Responsible Fatherhood & Healthy Families Act of 2009, S. 1309, 111th Cong. § 105(a)(2)(D)
(2009) (listing proposed conditions on use of funds for employment programs); KARIN MARTINSON ETAL.,
URBAN INST., THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARTNERS FOR FRAGILE FAMILIES DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS 7,

31 (2007), available at http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/4115l11_fragile families.pdf (discussing the
need for federal waivers to allow employment-related services); see also CTR. FOR POLICY RESEARCH,
PARENTS TO WORK!: PROGRAM OUTCOMES AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 63 (2011), available at http://www.

coloradodads.com/UserFiles/File/Parents-to-Work!_ProgramOutcomes-andEconomicjImpact.pdf
[hereinafter PARENTS TO WORK] (recommending that employment programs be considered permissible
child support as activity authorized to receive federal matching dollars).
208. See, e.g., FY2012 OCSE Section 1115 GrantOpportunitiesand Pre-Application Conference Call,
ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMs. (June 6, 2012), http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/grants/resources/
ocsesection_11 15preapplication callstranscript.pdf; OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FUNDING OPPORTUNITY, EVALUATION OF NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT NONCUSTODIAL PARENT EMPLOYMENT

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (2012), availableat http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/foalview/HHS-2012ACF-OCSE-FD-0537/pdf; OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FUNDING OPPORTUNITY: NATIONAL
CHILD SUPPORT NONCUSTODIAL PARENT EMPLOYMENT DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (2012), available at

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/foa/view/HHS-2012-ACF-OCSE-FD-0297/pdf.
209. See, e.g., MARTINSON ET AL., supra note 207. The Parents in Fragile Families demonstration

projects were designed to strengthen fathers' financial and emotional connections to their children and
build partnerships between government agencies and community organizations. Id. at v.The PFF projects
were funded by federal grants as well through funds provided by foundations such as the Ford
Foundation. Id. at iv. The grant included resources for planning to allow government agencies and
community organizations to analyze and determine in advance how their collaboration would function.
Id. at v. These projects typically brought together child support agencies, workforce/employment
agencies, social service and health organizations, and schools. Id.
210. Id. at 7.
211. See, e.g., FY2012 OCSE Section 1115 Grant Opportunitiesand Pre-ApplicationConference Call,

ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMs., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/grants/resources/2012

conference_
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State governments and localities also experience structural and communication barriers, which constrain them from developing effective multiagency
projects.2 12 Agencies have differing goals, incentives, funding sources, and
outcomes measures.2 13 In addition, they often have different database systems
that do not permit cross-agency communication and exchange of information.2 14
As a result, child support agencies, employment agencies, and public benefits
agencies often work in silos rather than joining forces to create comprehensive
programs for employing and collecting support from low-income parents.215
Legal services advocates and poverty policy experts must take the lead on
pushing for long-term, structural changes that will make child support a truly
meaningful resource for low-income families. 216 These organizations often fall
victim to the same silo effect that plagues government agencies.2 17 Family law
advocates work on child support issues, anti-poverty experts focus on public
benefits, employment advocates address job creation, and housing specialists
work to improve housing conditions and expand affordable housing. Constrained
by funding restrictions, narrow missions, limited resources, and crushing need,
these advocates are committed to their work but often do not collaborate

call.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2012); OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FUNDING OPPORTUNIY
EVALUATION OF NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT NONCUSTODIAL PARENT EMPLOYMENT DEMONSTRATION PROJ-

EcTs (2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/open/foalviewlHHS-2012-ACF-OCSE-FD-0537/
pdf; OFFICE OF CHILD SuPPoRr ENFORCEMENT, FUNDING OPPORTUNY: NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT
NONCUSTODIAL PARENT EMPLOYMENT DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (2012), availableat http://www.acf.hhs-

.gov/grants/open/foa/view/HHS-2012-ACF-OCSE-FD-0297/pdf.
212. See Scott D. Pattison, Eliminating Silos in Government, GOVERNING STArES & LOCALITIEs (Apr.
5, 2006), http://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/Eliminating-Silos-in-Government.htnl.
213. BUILDING CHANGES, SILOS TO SYSTEMS: SOLUTIONS FOR VULNERABLE FAMILIES 2-3 (2012),
availableat http://monarchhousing.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SilostoSystemsSummary
Report.pdf.

214. Id. at 2.
215. The term "silo effect" is frequently used in business and organizational management literature
but it has also been applied to legal organizations and government agencies. See Richard E. Levy &
Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents,89 TEx. L. REV. 499,510 (2011). Levy and Glicksman
explain this phenomenon as follows: "[t]he isolated silo rising above the plains is an evocative metaphor

for the propensity of departments or divisions within a large organization to become isolated, with a
resulting failure to communicate and pursue common goals." Id.
This silo approach is reflected in other fields in which government and the non-profit sector have
attempted to decrease poverty. For example, anti-poverty initiatives and community economic
development programs were traditionally relegated to two different policy and government agency
spheres. See generally Jesse L. White, Jr., Community Economic Development and Poverty Alleviation:
An Overview of Panel 4, Proceedings, New Frontiers in Poverty Research and Policy: A Summit on
Poverty, 10 EMP. RTs. & EMP. PoL' YJ. 121, 124-25 (2006). Policymakers and advocates began arguing for

a breakdown of this silo approach. "We began to understand that community development was an
essential step in the process of economic development, and that community development and economic
development, broadly understood, could, in fact, have a role to play in helping lift people out of poverty."
Id. at 125.
216. See, e.g., Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 199, at 8-21.
217. See, e.g., JILL DAVIEs, PoLICy BLUEPRINT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND POVERTY 15 (Nat'l
Domestic Violence Res. Ctr., Building Comprehensive Solutions to Domestic Violence Publication No.
15, 2002), availableat http://www.vawnet.org/AssocFilesVAWnet/BCS15_BP.pdf.
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sufficiently to address the connections among the issues on which they
advocate. 2 18 In order to address the underlying barriers preventing low-income
parents from adequately supporting their children, advocates, policymakers, and
government agencies must break out of their silos.
Advocates and state actors must collaborate on projects that will generate
employment, expand the safety net for vulnerable members of communities, and
enhance the ability of parents to support their children. 21 9 The following Part
identifies a number of issues and initiatives around which those in the non-profit,
government, and judicial sectors might coalesce.
1. Expanding Employment Opportunities for Nonresident Parents
Over the past seventeen years, states have developed programs to improve the
earning capacity of low-income fathers while also working to strengthen ties
between these fathers and their children. Often dubbed "fatherhood programs,"
these projects have had mixed success but illuminate a number of important
considerations for those designing successful employment/child support collaborations.22 0
The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement sponsored seven Responsible Fatherhood programs in eight sites around the country between 1998 and
2000.221 These programs targeted unemployed and underemployed nonresident
parents and were designed to enhance participants' employment and income.2 22
The program accepted mandatory referrals from the courts as well as volun-

218. See Peter B. Edelman & Jonathan M. Smith, RationingJustice: The Need Is Up and the Money Is
Down, WASH. LAW., Mar. 2010, at 33, available at http://www.legalaiddc.org/pressroom/documents/

WashingtonLawyer-RationingJustice.pdf.
219. Policy organizations have identified a number of critical issues that, if addressed, could lead to
dramatic reductions in poverty:
[A]nalysis by the Center for American Progress (CAP) demonstrates that the nation's poverty
rate could fall 26[%] through improvements in four areas: minimum wage, the Earned Income
Tax Credit, child tax credits, and child care subsidies. Other policies such as asset building,
access to sound financial services, and a modernized unemployment insurance program could
help achieve a 50[%] reduction according to the analysis.
FederalLawmakers Should Commit to CuttingPoverty, CLASP, http://www.clasp.org/issues/pages?type=

poverty-and-opportunity&id=0057 (last visited on Sept. 25, 2012).
220. MARTINSON ET AL., supra note 207, at 20. The Parents Fair Share program was implemented in

seven sites around the country from 1994 to 1996. Id. at 4. Non-custodial fathers who were delinquent in
paying support due to unemployment were ordered to participate in these demonstration projects. Id. The
project focused on TANF cases only and participants received employment services. Id.The program had
some positive impact on the payment of child support but the impact was minimal. Id. at 4-5. Earnings of
more economically disadvantaged fathers increased somewhat but those of more employable fathers
remained constant. Id. at 5. Also, participants tended to use job search services but fewer engaged in skill
building initiatives. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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teers. 2 2 3 While participants in several sites increased their earnings and child
support payments, the program had great difficulty retaining participants.
Evaluators saw increases in payments when personnel from the government child
5
support offices had close ties with the participating sites. 22
States, in coordination with non-profit organizations, developed additional
initiatives.22 6 In 2006, for example, the New York State Legislature approved the
Strengthening Families Through Stronger Fathers Initiative. 2 27 The program
targeted low-income nonresident parents, defining "low-income" as at or below
200 percent of the poverty guideline. 2 28 The New York Office of Temporary and
Disability Assistance contracted with five well-established agencies to provide

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. From 2000 to 2003, nine states implemented thirteen Parents in Fragile Families
demonstration projects. These projects targeted unmarried men ages 16-25 who had not formally
acknowledged paternity and did not have significant involvement with the child support enforcement. Id.
at iv. Approximately half of the men who participated in these projects did not have a high school diploma
or GED and approximately one third were employed. Id. at vi. The economic conditions in the areas
where the sites were located worsened over time. In several of the site cities (including Baltimore,
Denver, Los Angeles, and New York), the unemployment rate was higher than 6% and reflected the
declining economy. Id. at 10. According to the evaluators of the projects, "[m]any of the cities and
neighborhoods in which the projects operated had relatively poor economies, and participants often had
to seek jobs outside of their immediate neighborhoods because of the lack of local job opportunities." Id.
The goals of the project were to strengthen the fathers' financial and emotional ties to their children as
well as to bolster partnerships between government agencies and community based non-profit
organizations. Id. at iv-v. The evaluation of the projects found that states offered services and programs
that varied greatly in their intensity and comprehensiveness. Id. at vii-viii. Drop-out rates were very high,
reaching to 70% or more in some programs. In some cases the participants found employment and left the
program, but in other cases personal problems or lack of continuing interest or commitment led to the
attrition. Id. at x.
Overall, with the exception of one program, employment rates did not significantly change over the life
of the program. Those who were employed had low earnings, though the earnings increased over time.
The number of child support orders increased and the amount of the orders seemed to remain relatively
stable, at least one year after enrollment in the program began. Id. at 20. According to the evaluation of
the employment component of the PFF projects, "[t]he relatively low economic outcomes for PFF
participants suggests that the appropriate intensity and mix of skills development and supportive services
to address other employment barriers was not achieved by these child support-related employment
services demonstrations." Id.
Successful PFF programs offered a variety of services and worked closely with providers in a number
of areas. For example, those that offered legal services to fathers to help them resolve visitation and other
related issues were more likely to see fathers continue to participate. Similarly, those projects that
partnered with or had strong ties to public health programs were better able to retain and serve
participants. Through these partnerships, participants could access health, dental, mental health and
substance abuse treatment services. Those evaluating the PFF programs found that "[p]roviding a
comprehensive range of services tailored to the individual needs of each participating young father is
important." Id. at xii.
226. See, e.g., PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 4-6, 8 (discussing Tennessee's Child Support

Employment and Parenting Program (CSEPP) and a voucher program of the Indianapolis Private
Industry Council).
227. TANNEHILL ET AL., supra note 186, at iv.
228. PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 4 (citing SORENSEN, supra note 1).
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employment assistance. 2 2 9 Each program used a one-to-one case management
model in which participants met with an individual case manager at least once a
month.2 30 Case managers assessed participants' needs, developed plans, and
assisted in implementing the plans.23 1
Participants received a variety of services depending on their needs, including
job search assistance, job training, parenting or relationship education, legal
services to assist with modification of orders and reinstatement of driver's
licenses, child support-related services, financial planning assistance, education
assistance, mental health counseling, and housing assistance.23 2 Some of the
programs used financial incentives such as transportation assistance or monetary
stipends to encourage continued participation 2 3 3 and developed innovative
vehicles for motivating participants, such as loan programs to pay child support
arrears and transitional assistance for hard-to-employ workers.2 34
The evaluation of the program demonstrated that participants experienced an
increase in employment and wages as compared to nonresident parents who did
not participate in the program.235 In addition, the rate of child support payment
increased.2 36 One of the challenges identified was the difficulty retaining
participants in the projects, particularly when many of the participants were
237
transient.
Colorado and Texas have also undertaken employment assistance programs for
nonresident parents. 238 In Texas, the Office of the Attorney General, the Texas

229. KYE LEPPOLD & ELAINE SORENSEN, URBAN INST., STRENGTHENING FAMILIES THROUGH STRONGER
FATHERS: FINAL IMPACT REPORT FOR THE PILOT EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS vii, 4 (2011), available at

http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412442-Strengthening-Families-Through-Stronger-Fathers.pdf.
230. Id. at 8.
231. Id. at 4.
232. Id. at 7-8.
233. Id. at 8.
234. See TANNEHILL ET AL., supra note 186, at xi, xvi. One contractor, Seedco, provided transitional

monetary employment assistance to particularly difficult to employ participants. Id. at x, 34. Seedco also
used pilot funding to pay for an innovative loan program that helped participants pay child support
arrears. Id. at xi, xvii, 46-48.
235. Id. at 26 ("The results suggest that the fatherhood programs had strong positive effects on both
wages and employment. Participants earned an average of $986 more than comparison group members in
the year after enrollment, a 22[%] increase in wages. Participants were also 9.8 percentage points more
likely to be employed than the comparison group in the year after enrollment, a 19[%] increase in the
likelihood of employment.").
236. Id. at vii ("Child support outcomes were similarly positive. Participants paid an average of $504
more in child support than nonparticipants in the year after enrollment-a 38[%] increase. The difference
grew over time and remained substantial one year after enrollment. On average, participants were 22[%]
more likely than the comparison group to pay child support in the year after enrollment.").
237. TANNEHILL ET AL., supra note 186, at xvi. Note the detailed data description at page 28. In
addition, many of the project participants were hard to employ due to criminal records, lack of
educational attainment, and limited or no work histories. Id.
238. Virginia also has a similar program. See generally VA. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., VIRGINIA'S
INTENSIVE CASE MONITORING PROGRAM (2012), availableat http://www.dss.virginia.gov/news/2021/icmp.
pdf.
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Workforce Commission, and Texas child support courts joined together to
implement a pilot project in five sites throughout the state. The program, entitled
Noncustodial Parent Choices (NCP Choices), is designed to provide employment
assistance to individuals who are delinquent in their child support payments.23 9
Expansion of the program has continued since 2005, and it now operates in 18
sites.24 0 The philosophy of the program is that nonresident parents should be
given a clear choice: pay child support, participate in work force initiatives, or go
to jail.24 1 Participants in the NCP Choices program engaged in workforce
development activities at much higher rates than those in the comparison group
who did not participate in the program.24 2 Participants paid more support and did
so more consistently. 2 4 3 The evaluation of the Texas program demonstrated that
the amounts collected and the consistency with which support was paid were
correlated with the degree of collaboration perceived to exist among the various
project partners as well as the motivation level of the NCP. 2" The participants
were employed at higher rates than non-participants,24 5 although, interestingly,
those non-participants who were employed had higher earnings than those in
NCP Choices. 2 4 6 Individuals obtaining entry-level jobs through NCP Choices did
not seem to increase their earnings as they gained job experience.24 7 This

239. SCHROEDER & DOUGHTY, supra note 206, at I.The program focuses on families that currently
receive or formerly received TANF or Medicaid. Id. at 1,3. The NCP Choices program was modeled after
the Choices welfare to work program adopted in Texas for TANF recipients. The Choices program
primarily utilized a "work first" approach although the program offered some training and postemployment development opportunities for participants. Id. at 1-2.
240. Noelita L. Lugo, M.S.S.W., Presentation: Noncustodial Parent (NCP) Choices, A Child
Support-Led Employment Program 3 (June 15, 2012) (on file with author).
241. SCHROEDER & DOUGHTY, supra note 206, at ix ("The distinguishing features of NCP Choices are
mandatory participation and clear choices-pay child support, participate in work readiness efforts, or
risk jail time.").
242. Id. at 10.
243. Id. at x ("Monthly collection rates from NCP Choices participants were forty-seven percent
higher than from the comparison group in the first year after the program, and the amounts collected
averaged $57 per month higher. Moreover, these positive impacts continued well into the second through
fourth years of the program, suggesting that the long-term economic benefits will continue to accrue.
Eighty-four percent of NCP Choices clients made at least one payment within a year of program entry.").
244. Id. at 58 ("As observed with general child support collections measures, site-level impacts on
consistency of collections were found to be highly correlated with subscale scores on Partners Capable
and Collaborating. This suggests that sites in which all partners were generally perceived to be doing their
parts to ensure the program's success showed the strongest impacts on consistency of child support
collections." (internal citations omitted)). See also id. at xii, 75 (pointing to NCP motivation as a factor
correlating to increases in child support collection).
245. Id. at 59. This positive impact on employment rates continued over a two- to four-year period.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 72 ("The finding of reduced earnings levels among the employed is not a surprise in a
program with documented impacts showing it moved large numbers of low-income individuals into jobs.
In fact the same pattern of reduced earnings was observed for employed non-custodial parents engaged in
workforce services in the Bootstrap Project. The work-first approach to workforce development is based
in part on the assumption that many of those receiving these services should learn valuable work skills by
simply getting and keeping a job. The hope is that after gaining such experience, they will either advance
within their organizations or move on to better-paying jobs. It is not yet clear whether the local job
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suggests that the workforce programs may be moving larger numbers of
nonresident parents quickly into jobs; however, the jobs are and remain low-wage
jobs. 248 Evaluation of the program demonstrated that economic conditions in the
local economy have a "constraining effect" on the success of the NCP Choices
Program. 2 4 9 Not surprisingly, when job growth is slow and unemployment is
high, the success of the program is impacted.25 0
The Texas evaluation points out that the increased employment of NCP
participants and the increased longevity of this employment enhanced their
prospects for qualifying for unemployment insurance should they be laid off from
their jobs. 2 5 ' This eligibility for unemployment provides an important financial
safety net for both the nonresident parent and the resident parent and children
because unemployment payments can be used to pay child support orders.
In Colorado, the Arapahoe County Child Support Enforcement Division, the
county workforce agency, and the county court joined together to implement
Parents to Work.25 2 The program provides assistance to unemployed and
underemployed nonresident parents through co-located child support and employment services.25 3 Participants receive employment assistance2 54 as well as help
managing child support enforcement efforts, including reinstatement of driver's
licenses and modification of support orders.25 5 The program offers incentives and

markets can provide sufficient advancement opportunities to allow these NCPs to increase their earnings
over time. The evidence from the longer-term outcomes in the present report indicates that two to four
years after the program the earnings deficit that occurred in the short term has not been eliminated.")
(internal citations omitted)). The report notes that earnings were measured during the worst years of the
recession which could account for the slow growth in wages for entry level workers. Id.
248. Id. at x-xi. The disparity could also be related to the numbers of individuals participating in the
program, differential in skill levels, and disparities in work histories. See also PARENTS To WORK, supra
note 207, at 8. ("Project SHARE also found that those who appeared at court and chose to participate in
the program had comparable employment rates but lower earnings relative to those who appeared but
chose not to participate. This may indicate that those who chose to seek employment without assistance
had stronger work histories and greater skill levels. In the Parents' Fair Share Demonstration Project, the
evaluators concluded that the services did not have much effect on employment. Further, although
earnings grew over time, they remained very low." (internal citations omitted)). The question of whether
to adopt a work-first approach or a longer-term strategy to train individuals in skill areas that will garner
higher wages is an ongoing policy debate in the welfare to work context.
249. SCHROEDER & DOUGHTY, supra note 206, at xii.
250. Id. at xii; see also id. at 61, 76 (discussing effect of unemployment rate) ("Overall, NCPs ordered
into the program participated in workforce development to a high degree, but they did so even more when
the economy was growing, as indicated by moderate employment growth rates. The impacts of NCP
Choices on child support collections frequency, average amount collected, and consistency of collections
were all significantly higher under conditions of moderate employment growth. Program impacts on
employment were greater when the local unemployment rate was low, or in other words when there was
lesser competition for locally available jobs.").
251. Id. at 63-65.
252. PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 1.
253. Id. at 9.
254. Id. at 11-12.
255. Id. at 9.
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supports such as transportation assistance as well as sanctions by the court for
noncompliance with the program. 256 Teei
There is significant collaboration among the
child support agency, the workforce agency and the court.25 7 All three institutions
developed criteria for the program and ensure that ongoing monitoring for
compliance is taking place. 2 5 8 The court has authority to order review hearings to
monitor compliance, dismiss contempt actions for compliance, and mandate
ankle bracelet monitoring or impose jail time for noncompliance.25 9
Evaluation of the Colorado program found that employment and earnings
increased for participants as compared to nonparticipants.2 60 In addition, child
support payments increased, which benefitted families as well as the regional
economy.2 61
Overall, the outcomes of these employment and child support programs have
been mixed.2 62 While some report increases in employment and child support
payment, others have seen less promising results.26 3 One of the challenges that
these programs have faced is recruiting and retaining participants.2 6 4 Successful

256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 9, 12.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12.

260. Id. at 33-34.
261. Id. at 61. Those participants who more actively participated in the services available had more
success obtaining employment and enhancing earnings. Id.
The impact of the project on NCP employment rates was more pronounced for the Colorado
project [than the Texas NCP Choices program]. Overall, 23[%] more program participants
showed earnings in the year after program enrollment in Colorado, as compared with 8[%] in
Texas. Nor did Colorado project participants experience the decline in earnings relative to the
comparison group that occurred in NCP Choices. While mean earnings for Texas project
participants following enrollment were significantly lower than those in the comparison group,
they were statistically equivalent in the Colorado project ($8657 versus $8377), although the
treatment group experienced steeper declines relative to their pre-program earnings.
Id.

262. Id. at 8.
263. Id. at 8. "[P]roject SHARE found no evidence of better payment among those who opted into and
out of services and the Tennessee CSEPP program reported that both prior to and following program
participation, about a quarter of those who were enrolled paid no support." Id. (citations omitted) (citing
IRMA PEREZ-JOHNSON, ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., GIVING NON-CUSTODIAL PARENTS
OPTioNS: EMPLOYMENT AND CHILD SUPPORT OUTCOMES OF THE SHARE PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT XX

(2003), availableat http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/wtw-grants-eval98/shareO3/report.pdf.).
264. See PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 5. "SHARE noted that 'the process of identifying
eligible noncustodial parents and engaging them in SHARE was lengthy and often unsuccessful." Id.
(quoting IRMA PEREZ-JOHNSON ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., GIVING NON-CUSTODIAL
PARENTS OPTIoNS: EMPLOYMENT AND CHILD SUPPORT OUTCOMES OF THE SHARE PROGRAM: FINAL REPor

24 (2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/wtw-grants-eval98/shareO3/report.pdf.). Similarly, the
evaluation of the Texas NCP Choices program warned that "research does suggest that-excluding
circumstances beyond programs' control (e.g., an economic downturn)-there are two fundamental
challenges facing enhanced child support enforcement programs for noncustodial parents: difficulty
implementing services as designed, and difficulty in recruiting, enrolling, and retaining participants."
PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 5 (quoting SCHROEDER & DOUGHTY, supra note 206, at 12). The
authors note that participation issues are far more complex and problematic than implementation issues,
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projects have certain elements in common: 1) employment services personnel are
co-located in courts or at child support agencies, 265 2) child support personnel are
assigned to or co-located on-site at employment programs to provide information
and assistance, and 3) comprehensive job training and education opportunities
such as apprenticeship or GED programs (whether by the organization directly or
through collaboration with other agencies) are available.2 66 In addition, successful programs use incentives such as temporary reduction of support,2 6 7 reinstatement of driver's licenses, transportation assistance and work stipends. 2 6 8 Partners

with a "disconcertingly" high proportion of participants either failing to enroll or dropping out. In a
similar vein, the Tennessee CSEPP program reported that half of those who were referred to the program
were terminated in the same month, generally due to a failure to appear for the intake. PARENTS TO WORK,
supra note 207, at 5.

265. Id. at iv, 62. "Research shows that court-based or court-affiliated programs are more effective
than other referral sources in securing participants." Id. at 5 (citing Elaine Sorensen, Policy Optionsfor
Low-Income Fathers Cost Relatively Little, 29 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT., 616, 616-18 (2010). By

involving the court, noncustodial parents are given the option of paying support on their own, facing the
consequences of a contempt action, or enrolling in a program designed to address barriers to payment. Id.
(citing ELAINE SORENSEN, ET AL, URBAN INST., STRENGTHENING FAMILIES THROUGH STRONGER FATHERS

INITIATIVE: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST YEARS OF THE EvALuATON (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/
url.cfm?ID=411870&renderforprint= 1; SCHROEDER & DOUGHTY, supra note 206). "The advantages of

court involvement have led a number of jurisdictions to adopt 'problem solving courts' or 'fatherhood
courts,' which are directly involved in ordering participation in employment services and monitoring
compliance." PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 5 (citing J. Jim RAUSCH & J. TOM RAWLINGS, NAT'L
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, INTEGRATING PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PRACTICES INTO
THE CHILD SUPPORT DocKEr (2008), available at http://nasje.org/news/newsletter08O3/RlcNCJFCJ
IntegratingProblemSolving.pdf); see also id. at 11; POLICY STUDIES INC., LOUISIANA Low-INCOME

FATHERHOOD PROGRAM: IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION AND EARLY OUTCOMES 9-11 (2004), available at
https://www.policy-studies.com/Portals/0/docs/Publications/Fatherhood/LA-Low-income-FatherhoodProgram.pdf.
266. TANNEHILL ET AL., supra note 186, at xvi.
267. See LAURA WYCKOFF ET AL., NAVIGATING CHILD SUPPORT LESSONS FROM THE FATHERS AT WORK
INrrATIVE 40-41 (2009), available at www.ppv.org/ppv/publications/assets/274_publication.pdf (noting

that the Philadelphia Family Court has entered into an agreement with a community-based organization,
Impact, in which nonresident parents participating in an Impact jobs program can receive a temporary
reduction of child support while they are participating. Similarly, the Center for Employment
Opportunities (CEO), an organization providing job services to those recently released from incarceration, has partnered with the New York City Human Resources Administration, Office of Child Support.
CEO assists nonresident parents in obtaining reduced child support orders that remain in effect so long as
the parents participate in CEO programs.).
268. PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 6. "Sorensen argued that financial aid or other incentives
are critical to operating an effective employment program for low-income parents." Id. (citing Elaine
Sorensen, Rethinking Public Policy Toward Low-Income Fathers in the Child Support Program, 29 J.
Pol'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 604, 604-10 (2010)). For example, the New York Strengthening Families
Through Stronger Fathers Initiative found that incentives like transportation assistance, stipends, and gift
cards helped with participant retention. PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 6 (citing TESS G.
TANNEHILL ET AL., supra note 186, at 14-15). Wage subsidy incentives, in the form of transitional jobs or
temporary stipends, are also helpful. Since low-income fathers typically face pressures to find immediate
employment and pay child support, both programs and fathers tend to shy away from skill enhancement
programs. PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 6 (citing Elaine Sorensen, Rethinking Public Policy
Toward Low-Income Fathersin the Child Support Program,29 J. Po'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT., 604,604-10

(2010)).
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in differing agencies conduct effective follow-up, monitor compliance of
participants,269 and develop ties with legal services and public health organizations that provide a range of supportive services. 2 7 0 Finally, successful projects
impose meaningful sanctions for non-participation. 2 7 1 However, it is difficult to
prove causal connections between certain features of programs and the success
they may experience in the form of increased collection or increased employment.2 72 Evaluators have surmised that success may be attributed in part to
participation in a particularly well-designed program and in part to the
motivation level of the nonresident parent.273
2. Increase Earnings for Low-income Resident and Nonresident Parents
a. Minimum Wage Increases and Living Wage Initiatives
One obvious yet critical reality is that once employed, low-income wage
earners need to be able to earn enough money to support their children. Studies
have shown that increased employment without additional income does not pull
families out of poverty or bring about significant change in children's wellbeing.
A study from the Manpower Development Research Corporation (MDRC)
analyzing outcomes at eleven welfare reform programs determined that "[iut was
only in programs in which increased employment was accompanied by increased
income that there were positive effects, such as increased school achievement for
elementary-aged children." 2 7 4 The study concluded that it is critical to increase
income for low-income wage earners, including ensuring that workers receive
work support benefits such as tax credits and subsidies to which they are
entitled.27 5
Job assistance and job training will not ensure that parents are able to earn
enough to support their children because the number of higher wage jobs is

269. See SCHROEDER & DOUGHTY, supra note 206, at 56; PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at 62

("[A]nother critical feature of Parents to Work was the strong and distinct role of the program partners.
Child support identified cases, set them for court, and monitored compliance. The workforce program did
intake and employment assessments, operated an intensive Job Club for supervised job search, provided
employment skills services, and attempted to address barriers by providing help with transportation and
cultivating sympathetic employers. Although the court did not make the program compulsory or
administer consequences for noncompliance, it strongly encouraged participation and scheduled frequent
review hearings to monitor compliance. Each agency utilized its core competencies and adopted a
pragmatic and energetic approach that overcame some programmatic silos.").
270. MARTINSON ET AL., supra note 207, at 16.
271. PARENTS TO WORK, supra note 207, at iv.
272. SCHROEDER & DOUGHTY, supra note 206, at 78.

273. Id. ("The best we can conclude is that a portion of the measured program effect is due to Choices
participation, and a portion is due to the motivating properties of the choice NCPs are given.").
274. RON HASKINS & WENDELL PRIMUS, BROOKINGS INST., WELFARE REFORM & PovERTY 8 (2001),

availableat http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/07poverty-haskins.aspx.
275. Id. at 10.
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shrinking. Even prior to the recession, the number of middle class jobs was
decreasing and low-wage jobs were on the rise.276 The recession exacerbated this
trend with new job growth in 2010 and 2011 concentrated in sectors with median
wages below $15 per hour.27 7 The most available occupations in industries that
experienced the highest growth in 2010 were retail salespeople, cashiers, and
food service workers. 2 7 8 All three occupations have median wages below $10.00
per hour.2 7 9 The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that "low wage jobs will
dominate in seven of the ten highest growth occupations over the next decade
including home health aides, customer service workers, retail sales employees,
and office clerks." 28 0
One avenue that child support advocates for low-income resident and
nonresident parents might consider is joining forces with employment law
advocates to push for increases in minimum wage laws and living wage
initiatives. From 2007 to 2009, Congress raised the federal minimum wage from
$5.15 to $7.25 per hour.2 8 1 This was the first increase in ten years and, despite the
increase, the minimum wage rate failed to keep up with the rate of inflation.282
Economists have calculated that if the minimum wage "had kept pace with the
rate of inflation over the past forty years, it would now be more than $10.00 per
2 3
hour."m
Currently, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have minimum
wages higher than the federal minimum wage and legislators around the country

276. NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, BRIEFING PAPER: A STRONG MINIMUM WAGE CAN HELP WORKING
FAMILIES, BUSINESSES AND OUR ECONOMY RECOVER 1 (2011), availableat http://nelp.3cdn.net/02b725e73
dc24e0644LOim6bkno9.pdf [hereinafter NELP BRIEFING PAPER].
277. Id.

278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2 (citing Kristina J. Bartsch, OccupationalEmployment Projectionsto 2018, 132 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 38 (2009).
281. Memorandum from Celinda Lake et al., Lake Research Partners, to Interested Parties at 2 (June
7, 2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/rtmw/uploads/LRPMinWageMemo_06-07-2011.
pdfnocdn= 1.
282. Ilan Kolet & Bob Willis, Minimum Wage in U.S. Fails to Beat Inflation: Chart of the Day,

BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-28/minimum-wage-in-u-s-failsto-beat-inflation-chart-of-the-day.html; see also Memorandum from Celinda Lake et al., supra note 281,

at 2.
283. Kolet & Willis, supra note 282, at 2. Polls show that there is widespread support for an increase
of the minimum wage. Id. at 3. According to this memorandum:
[i]n 2006, minimum wage initiatives passed in Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, Montana, Nevada
and Ohio. The coalitions that contributed to the electoral success of these initiatives were
broad. In Missouri, where the initiative passed by more than a three-to-one margin (76% favor,
24% oppose), exit polling reveals a strong majority of every key demographic group
supporting the increase, including 58% of Republicans, 79% of independents, and 93% of
Democrats.
Id.
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are trying to expand the state count.28 4 Most recently, the Rebuild America Act,
introduced in March 2012, proposes to increase the federal minimum wage to
$9.80 per hour by 2014 and index the rate to the Consumer Price Index so that the
minimum wage rises to meet costs.285
Local governments throughout the United States have also enacted living wage
initiatives that require local governments and contractors doing business with
local governments to pay a wage that lifts individuals and families above the
poverty level. 2 8 6 One hundred twenty-five municipalities have enacted living
wage ordinances mandating increased wages designed to bring workers to a
minimal standard of living.28 7 Most of the ordinances enacted to date only apply
to public employers or government contractors.28 8 Some ordinances, however,
apply to private employers that do not have contractual relationships or receive
aid from local governments.2 89

284. Steven Greenhouse, Raising the Floor on Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2012, at B1, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/1Olbusinessleconomy/a-campaign-to-raise-the-minimum-wage.html?
pagewanted=all (citing efforts in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and
Missouri).
285. Id. The Rebuild America Act, introduced by Senator Tom Harkin on March 29, 2012, includes a
provision to gradually increase the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $9.80 by 2014 and better track
future increases to the inflation rate. See Rebuild America Act, S. 2252, 112th Cong. § 261, (2012). In
addition, the bill proposes an increase in mandated tipped wages from $2.13 per hour to 70% of the
minimum wage. Id. Advocates of the legislation argue that these changes would favorably impact
low-wage earning women. See FairPayfor Women RequiresIncreasing the Minimum Wage and Tipped
Minimum Wage, NAT'L WOMEN's L. CTR. (Aug. 14,2012), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/fair-pay-women-

requires-increasing-minimum-wage-and-tipped-minimum-wage.
286. For example, Santa Fe defines "living wage" as "the minimum hourly wage necessary for a
person to achieve some specific standard of living." See Living Wage, SANTA FE, N.M., http://www.
santafenm.gov/index.aspx?NID=84 (last visited Sept. 26,2012).
287. NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECr, LOCAL LIvING WAGE LAWS AND COVERAGE 1-17 (2011), available at

http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/LocalLWLawsCoverageFINAL.pdfnocdn=1;

see also Chris

Tilly, Living Wage Laws in the United States: The Dynamics of a Growing Movement, in THREATS AND

OPPORTUNITIES INCONTENTIOUS POLITICS 143 (Maria Kousis & Charles Tilly, eds., 2005), available at
2
http://www.uml.edulcenters/CIC/Research/TillyResearch/cha8-Tilly%20living% 0wage-2005.pdf. The
Brennan Center for Justice has developed a model living wage ordinance. See Living Wage Ordinance,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/brennan-center-model-iivingwage-bill/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
288. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-220.03(a) (2012) ("All recipients of contracts or government assistance
in the amount of $100,000 or more shall pay their affiliated employees no less than the living wage.");
SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE, §4.65.020 (amended, Apr. 22, 2008) ("Any contractor providing services to
the City of Santa Monica pursuant to a contract in the amount of fifty four thousand two hundred dollars
($54,200.00) or more shall pay at least the minimum wage to any employee working on that contract for
work done on the contract.").
289. For example, the City of Santa Fe Living Wage Ordinance went into effect March 1, 2012 and
mandates that employers required to secure a business license or business registration from the city pay a
minimum wage of $10.29 per hour. See SANTA FE, N.M., CODE § 28-1 (as amended, effective Jan. 1,
2008). This increase was tied to the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the Western Region
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers. Living Wage, supra note 286.
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Proponents of minimum and living wage increases argue that such actions lead
to increased job growth and stronger consumer spending.2 90 Opponents of such
initiatives argue that such increases will lead to job losses 29 1 which would work
to the detriment of low-wage resident and nonresident parents. However, recent
research suggests that minimum wage increases do not cause job losses,29 2 even
during periods of recession and high unemployment.29 3 These findings should
spur legal services advocates and policy analysts focused on improving child
support collection to develop broader strategies, including advocating for
minimum wage increases.
b. Earned Income Tax Credits for Both Resident and Nonresident Parents
In an effort to bolster the ability of low-income parents to support their
children and incentivize continued child support payments, advocates and state
agencies should collaborate to extend federal and state Earned Income Tax
Credits (EITC) to nonresident parents. The EITC offers a refundable tax credit to
low-wage earning, resident parents.294 Child support economists point out that
"[w]hile the EITC and child support have successfully removed many lowincome working families from poverty, the combined effect of taxes and child
support payments can impoverish noncustodial parents working at or near the
minimum wage."29 5 Making the EITC available to nonresident parents helps
ensure that they have sufficient funds on which to subsist and are still able and
motivated to support their children.29 6 Washington, D.C. and New York were the
first jurisdictions to enact such an option.297 In 2009, Senator Bayh introduced

290. NELP BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 276, at 6.
291. See, e.g., Living Wage: What Business Groups Need to Know, U.S. CHAMBER CoM., http://www.

uschamber.com/issues/labor/living-wage-what-business-groups-need-know

(last visited Sept. 26, 2012).

292. NELP BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 276, at 4 (citing Arindrajit Dube et al., Minimum Wage Effects
Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties, 92 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 945, 962 (2010).
293.

NAT'L EMP'T LAw PROJECT RESEARCH BRIEF: MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS ACROSS STATE BORDERS 1

(2011), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/201 1/Dube%20Lester%20Reich%20Summary%204-2211.pdf?nocdn= 1; see also NELP BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 276, at 4-5 (citing Sylvia A. Allegretto et.
al., Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce Teen Employment? Accounting for Heterogeneityand Selectivity
in State Panel Data,50 INDUS. REL. 205 (2011)).
294. See generally KATIE KERSTETTER, D.C. FISCAL POLICY INST., DC's EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT

SUPPORTS WORKING FAMLIES ACROSS THE DISTRICT (2008), available at http://www.dcfpi.org/4-8-

08eitc.pdf.
295. LAURA WHEATON & ELAINE SORENSEN, URBAN INST., EXTENDING THE EITC To NONCUSTODIAL

PARENTS: POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS i (2009), available at https://www.taxpolicy

center.org/UploadedPDF/411906_noncustodial-parents.pdf.
296. See MARGUERITE ROULET, CTR. FOR FAMILY POLICY & PRACTICE, FINANCIAL LrERACY &

Low-INCOME NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS 10-11 (2009), availableat http://www.cffpp.org/publications/Policy-

finance.pdf.
297. Id.; see also D.C. CODE § 47-1806.04(g)(1-2)
(McKinney 2012).

(2012); N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(d-1)(B)(2)
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the Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2009, seeking to double
the federal earned income tax credit for low-income nonresident parents who
paid the full amount of child support owed on current orders for the previous tax
year.29 8 However, the bill was not enacted by Congress.29 9
In 2006, New York adopted an earned income tax credit for nonresident
parents who could demonstrate that they had paid child support owed for the
previous year."* The amount of the credit depended on the income of the
nonresident parent, with a maximum credit of $1143 available as of 2009.son
Evaluations of the New York EITC program for nonresident parents found that
the number of individuals utilizing the credit doubled over a relatively short
period of time,3 02 and the program increased the proportion of nonresident
parents paying their child support in full. 303 The effect on the rate of employment
and rate of compliance with child support orders was even stronger. 304 Those
paying the full amount of yearly support increased, suggesting that the EITC is
having a motivating effect on these parents.30 5 The evaluators recommend an
increase in the EITC as a means for further incentivizing work and increasing the
amount of support that low-income obligors pay.3 0 6

298. See Responsible Fatherhood & Healthy Families Act of 2009, S. 1309, 11Ith Cong. § 201(b)(1);
Elizabeth Lower-Basch, Responsible FatherhoodBill Would Expand EITC for Childless Adults and
Non-Custodial Parents, CTR. FOR L. & Soc. POL'Y (July 28, 2009), http://www.clasp.org/issues/lin-

focustype= child supportandfathers&id=0001; see also Wheaton & Sorensen, supra note 295, at 1.
299. See S. 1309 (111th), Responsible Fatherhood& Healthy FamiliesAct of 2009, GoVTRACK.US,

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/l11/sl309 (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
300. See ELAINE SORENSEN, URBAN

INST.,

INITIAL RESULTS FROM THE NEw YORK NONCUSTODIAL EITC

1 (2010) (demonstrating the way in which income of two minimum-wage-earning parents can change
dramatically based on child tax credits, child support, and EITC); AUSTIN NICHOLS ET AL., URBAN INST.,
THE NEW YORK NONCUSTODIAL PARENT EITC: ITS IMPACT ON CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT

2-3 (2012), availableat http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412610-The-New-York-Noncustodial-ParentEITC.pdf.
301. NICHOLS ET. AL., supranote 300, at 4 ("In 2009, the noncustodial parent EITC rose with income
until it reached its maximum amount of $1,143. The credit remained at this level while income was
between $5,970 and $7,470. After that, the credit declined as income increased, falling from $1,143 to
$609, until income reached $9,916. The credit remained at $609 as income rose from $9,916 to $16,420.
Then the credit phased out as income rose to a maximum threshold of $35,463.").
302. Id. at iii ("In 2006, the first year of the tax credit, just over 5100 noncustodial parents received the
tax credit; by 2010, this number exceeded 7700, a 50[%] increase."). During the first year that the credit
was available, 21% of those eligible to receive the credit did so; by 2009, 32% of those eligible were
actually receiving the credit. Id. at 19.
303. Id. at iii-iv ("The NCP EITC increased the proportion of noncustodial parents paying their child
support in full by approximately 1 percentage point. In 2009, 56[%] of noncustodial parents in New York
who had a child support order for at least half the year paid their child support in full. Because of the NCP
EITC, this figure is 1 percentage point higher than it would otherwise be, meaning about 2300 more
parents paid their child support in full.").
304. Id. at 19.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 20 ("One way to increase the participation rate and incentive effect of the NCP EITC is to
increase the amount of the credit. We estimate that if the NCP credit amount was increased by $100,

noncustodial parents with low orders would increase their child support by $122 and their likelihood of
working by .03 percentage points.").
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Federal and state EITCs have a proven record of lifting families out of poverty
while motivating parents to work.307 However, low-income nonresident parents
struggling to pay child support in the face of poverty have largely been excluded
from this benefit. 308 As the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has pointed
out:
the EITC for workers without children remains extremely small-too small

even to fully offset federal taxes for workers at the poverty line. Under current
law, a childless adult or noncustodial parent working full-time at the minimum
wage is ineligible to receive any EITC benefits. (Such an individual would
receive the maximum credit if he or she had children.) As a result, low-wage
workers not raising minor children are the only Americans whom the federal
income tax taxes into poverty. 309
Extension of the EITC to nonresident parents would incentivize child support
payments and employment while placing needed income back into the hands of
low-income parents.
3. Strengthening the Safety Net for Resident and Nonresident Parents
a. Child Support Assurance or Interim Supplemental Support
In making child support policy, states cannot assume that resident parents have
a safety net to rely on if they receive little or no child support. 3 o Those leaving
TANF due to time limits cannot necessarily depend on receiving child support.3 1

307. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 2

(2012), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-eitc.pdf.
308. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE
(2012), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-eitc.pdf.

EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 3

309. Id. at 3.

310. Similarly, evaluations of NCP employment programs have shown that low-income NCPs receive
few, if any, public benefits. In the New York NCP program, "[slixty-one percent of participants reported
that they received no government benefits. This ranged from 40[%] in Jamestown to 70[%] in Seedco.
Food stamps were the most common government benefit received, with 24[%] of participants reporting
that they received it. Medicaid was the next most common benefit reported, followed by unemployment
insurance and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)." LIPPOLD & SORENSEN, supra note 229,
at 16.
311. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO HEHS-98-168, WELFARE REFORM: CHILD SUPPORT AN
UNCERTAIN INCOME SUPPLEMENT FOR FAMILIEs LEAVING WELFARE 2 (1998) ("Many TANF families may

not be able to count on child support as a steady source of income when their time-limited welfare
benefits expire. In the first three states to enforce welfare benefit time limits-Connecticut, Florida, and
Virginia-only about 20 to 30[%] of families had any child support collected for them in the twelve
months before their welfare benefits were terminated. About one-half or more of the child support cases
without collections lacked a child support order legally obligating a noncustodial parent to pay child
support at the time the families' assistance was terminated, despite having a long history in the child
support program before time limits were implemented. For families whose child support was secured, the
median collections among the three states ranged from a total of $581 to $1,348 for the twelve-month
period.").
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As discussed previously, unless nonresident parents can develop skills and
enhance their earning capacity, those working full-time at or near the minimum
wage will qualify for a low-income adjustment and will pay little in support.
Enhancing earning capacities and addressing other barriers to employment take
time. In the meantime, low-income families, particularly those that are leaving or
have left TANF, need a safety net upon which to rely.3 12
Policy analysts and scholars recognize that child support enforcement cannot
solve or dramatically alter the poverty gap for children, particularly for families
with two very low-income parents." Some have called for the development of
an "assured child support benefit." 3 14 This benefit would supplement the amount
of child support to ensure a minimal standard of living for children whose parents
are working or engaged in work efforts but cannot adequately support their
families. 1 5 Under this model, the government would:
act as a guarantor for child support, ensuring that custodial parents receive a
minimum support payment each month. State and local governments would
continue to collect and distribute child support payments, as they do now. If
support collected from a noncustodial parent was less than the minimum level,
the government would subsidize the payment up to the amount of the
guaranteed benefit. 3 16
Child support assurance programs would calculate the benefit using a formula
based on percentage of income. 1 The support payment would be deducted from
the nonresident parent's earnings, akin to a Social Security deduction.31 8 In cases
where the amount of support falls below a minimum threshold, the child would
receive "an assured benefit" financed by a small increase in the Social Security
payroll tax.31 9 Proponents of this benefit suggest that it would be more akin to

312. See generally Ryan et al., supra note 21. The authors of this study demonstrate that a private
safety net in the form of actual or potential receipt of cash or in-kind assistance to low-income mothers is
"positively associated" with the socio-emotional wellbeing of children in those struggling households. Id.
at 278, 295.
313. See WALLER & PLOTKIN, supra note 95, at vi (1999); Irwin Garfinkel, The Limits of PrivateChild
Support and the Role of anAssured Benefit, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 38, at 185
("Perfection in enforcement would reduce the poverty gap for children potentially eligible for child
support by 24[%]; 76[%] of the poverty gap would remain."). Garfinkel estimates that if child support
amounts and collection efforts improved by half the poverty gap would decline by twelve percent. Id.
314. See, e.g., ANDREW BURWICK, CENTURY FoUND., IDEA BRIEF: CHILD SuPPoRr ASSURANCE 1 (2004),
available at http://tcf.org:8080/Plone/publications/2004/4/pb465.
315. Id. at 3.
316. Id. at 1.
317. Irwin Garfinkel, Sara S. McLanahan, & Phillip K. Robins, Findings of the Wisconsin Child
Support Reform Project: Introduction and Summary, in CHILD SuPpoPr ASSURANCE DESIGN ISSUES,
EXPECTED IMPACTS, AND POLITICAL BARRIERS AS SEEN FROM WIsCoNSIN

318. Garfinkel, supra note 313, at 184.
319. Id.

1,5 (1992).
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Social Security survivor benefits than welfare payments.32
Critics of the assured benefit idea suggest that it will incentivize nonpayment
of support and irresponsibility of nonresident parents.32 1 In addition, critics
argue, provision of such a benefit would result in more single-parent households
because women would have less incentive to search for responsible partners and
create lasting marriages.32 2 Finally, critics argue that the cost of such a program
would be substantial.3 23 The alternative, however, is to continue to perpetuate the
myth that if both parents work hard and the nonresident parent pays child support,
their children will have sufficient resources to subsist.
One other possibility, short of providing a long-term child support assurance
benefit, would be to provide an interim boost, in the form of a benefit or tax
credit, to families when the resident and/or nonresident parent is participating in a
work program designed to strengthen the parent's earning capacity and employability. If sufficient jobs were not available, parents could be required to
participate in community public works projects to compensate for the interim
support paid to their children. 324 This type of interim incentive program has the
potential to encourage parents to strengthen their earning capacity while ensuring
a minimal standard of living for low-income resident families.3 25 Similarly, if a
child support order were already in place, the state could allow for a temporary
reduction in support and provide interim supplemental child support during this
period.32 6
Child support assurance is needed for both non-TANF and TANF families.
Parents who rely on TANF benefits to subsist cannot count on receiving any "pass
through" contribution if the nonresident parent is unemployed or underemployed.
Therefore, one incentive advocates and state agencies might contemplate is
providing a "pass through" contribution to TANF families where the nonresident
parent is in school, enrolled in a substance abuse program, or participating in job

320. See id.
321. Allen M. Parkman, Why Child Support Assurance Won't Work, in CHILD SUPPORr: THE NEXT

FRONTIER, supra note 38, at 190-91.
322. Id. at 198.
323. Id. at 201. Parkman also suggests an assured child support benefit would have a marginal effect
on reducing poverty because most children who would be eligible for the benefit would not be poor. Id.
324. BERNSTEIN & LIN, supra note 147, at 15. Such community project requirements also serve as an
antidote to the problem of parents claiming to be unemployed but working in the underground economy.
The Philadelphia Child Support and Employment Assistance Program takes this approach in order to
subvert nonresident parent efforts to work "under the table." See Paul Bennett, Philadelphia Court
Program, Comment at Catholic University of America Conference: Strengthening the Link Between
Child Support and Employment Assistance (June 15, 2012) (unpublished comment) (on file with author).
325. See SCHROEDER & DOUGHTY, supra note 206, at 17 (acknowledging that there is a need to provide
long-term training to nonresident parents with limited educational experience or other barriers to
employment while at the same time providing monetary support to the resident parent).
326. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7301, 120 Stat. 4, 143 (2006) (explaining
that the federal government will waive the federal share up to one hundred dollars of passed through child
support for one child and two hundred dollars for two or more children).
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training. The state would provide a "pass through" amount at least equal to the
"pass through" threshold applied when support is collected.
b. Pass Through of Tax Intercepts
An additional source of much-needed income for low-income families who are
on TANF or who formerly received TANF is intercepted income tax refunds.
Child support agencies have the authority to intercept federal income tax refunds
and, until 2005, were required to use these funds to reimburse the government for
TANF funds expended rather than distributing such funds to current or former
TANF families.32 Tax intercepts were codified into federal law as an enforcement measure under the 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments.32 8 State
agencies were permitted to use this money to reimburse the federal government
for current TANF payments or for TANF arrearage. Tax intercept money has been
the most effective enforcement tool for recovering child support arrears in TANF
cases 3 2 9 and is often the only money the agency collects from the nonresident
parent in a particular year.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 authorized states to transfer this tax
intercept funding directly to families rather than using it to reimburse TANF
expenditures.33 0 These changes became effective in 2008; however, very few
states selected the option of distributing intercepts directly to families. 33 '
Allowing former TANF families to keep the income tax refund intercept could
have a number of positive effects. The funds would provide an infusion of money
for low-income families. Analogous state efforts to pass through additional funds
collected to families without decreasing TANF allotments have yielded favorable
outcomes. Wisconsin, for example, obtained a federal waiver in 1997 of the rules

327. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2006) (amended 2005).
328. Elaine Sorensen & Ariel Halpern, Child Support Reforms: Who Has Benefitted?, Focus, Fall

2000, at 38-41.
329. Hatcher, supra note 199 at 1053 n.124 (citing Hearing on Child Support Enforcement Reforms
Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (2000)

(statement of Wendell Primus, Director of Income Security, Center on Budget & Policy Priorities)
(explaining that in 2000, "[a]bout one-third of all arrears collections occur[ed] through the federal tax
refund intercept, but two-thirds of arrears collections for families on welfare [were] collected through the
federal tax refund intercept.").
330. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, §7301, 120 Stat. 4, 141-42 (2006); see also
VICKI TURETSKY, CTR. FOR LAw & Soc. POLICY, CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS IN THE DEFICIT REDUCTION

ACT 2 (2006).
331. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILIrrY OFFICE, GAO-11-196, CHILD Suppoitr ENFORCEMENT: DEPARTURES
FROM LONG-TERM TRENDS IN SOURCES OF COLLECTIONS AND CASELOADs REFLECT RECENT ECONOMIC

CONDITIONS n.p. (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dlll96.pdf ("Most states nationwide have not implemented 'family first' policy options since DRA. Several state CSE officials GAO
interviewed said they support 'family first' policies in principle, but funding constraints prevented
implementing these options, because giving more child support collections to families means states retain
less as reimbursement for public assistance costs.").
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requiring states to retain child support payments to reimburse welfare costs. 3 3 2
Instead, the state was permitted to pass through all child support collected to
TANF families, and these funds were disregarded when calculating the families'
TANF benefits.3 33 Studies of this experiment demonstrated "increased paternity
establishment, increased child support collections, and little additional governmental cost." 3 3 4 Similar outcomes are likely to occur and would perhaps be
strengthened with a transfer of substantial tax intercept income. Resident parents
will receive much-needed income and low-wage earning nonresident parents
may be less likely to seek "off the books" employment for fear that their tax
refund will go to reimburse the government for TANF benefits.
CONCLUSION

The rationale underlying child support policy is that both parents should
financially provide for the needs of their children, but this goal is becoming
harder and harder for low-wage earning parents to attain. Many states have
incorporated self-support reserves and low-income adjustments into their child
support guidelines as a way of balancing the subsistence needs of nonresident
parents with the support needs of children. However, these provisions have had
the unintended consequence of shifting the financial burden for supporting
children to low-income resident parents.
It is critical for child support commissions, courts, and legislatures to amend
these provisions and require full consideration of the impact that these provisions
have on resident parents. In order to balance the resources available to parents
with the needs of the children, adjudicators must thoroughly evaluate the
financial, public benefit, and in-kind resources available to both parents when
assessing whether and how to apply SSRs and low-income adjustments. This
more comprehensive analysis will enhance the integrity of child support
guidelines and make modest improvements in the financial stability of lowincome families.
However, this recalibration of SSRs and low-income adjustments is only a
short-term solution for a much larger structural problem-low-income parents do
not have sufficient financial resources to adequately support their children. Both
resident and nonresident parents need increased job opportunities, enhanced
skills, higher wages, and a stronger safety net to protect them when their

332. See Hatcher, supra note 199, at 1068 (citing DANIEL R. MEYER ET AL., W-2 CHILD SUPPorT
2: FINAL REPORr (2003), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/
csdelpublications/phase2/phase2-final.pdf) (describing' the results of Wisconsin's full pass-through
experiment).
333. Id.
334. Hatcher, supra note 199, at 1068 (citing MARCIA CANCIAN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF CHILD SUPPoKr
PASS-THROUGH AND DISREGARD POLICIES 4 (2006), availableat http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/
csde/publications/cancian-meyer-roff-d.pdf).
DEMONSTRATION PHASE
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employment and wage prospects are limited. There is no single method for
solving the vexing problems surrounding child support collection in cases
involving low-income parents. Instead, it is necessary for courts, government
agencies, and non-profits to break down their silos and use a variety of tools to
create incentives for parents to enhance their earning capacity and employability,
while ensuring that families can subsist. Through this melding of parental
responsibility and public responsibility, policymakers can ensure greater financial stability for children.

